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ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL
SOUTH
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ABSTRACT
Over the last several decades, efforts to regulate the environment
through traditional public law at national and international levels have
stalled. In contrast, private environmental governance has flourished as
nongovernmental entities have engaged in standard setting and assess-
ment practices traditionally left to public government. This Article ob-
serves that while private governance of producers’ environmental product
claims has grown tremendously in recent years, the vast majority of the
governance originates in the global North and thrusts the global North’s
economic and environmental agenda into the global South. In light of
recent empirical studies of the effectiveness of such governance, the Article
observes that the global North’s approach has not worked well—producers
in the global South see little benefit from participating in the schemes,
and the schemes have had little and in some cases adverse impacts on
the global South environment. The Article concedes that private or even
a hybrid public-private governance of producers’ environmental marketing
claims is no panacea to global environmental problems, but it argues that
the global South is likely to benefit from such governance, if the schemes
originate within the global South and are imbued with Relational Integ-
rity Regulation principles.
INTRODUCTION
Suresh and his wife Dalia have been growing coffee in Kodagu,
India, since the early 1990s. They are fortunate to farm land in the West-
ern Ghats, a mountainous “micro hotspot of biodiversity,” in western
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India.1 Silver oak trees create a canopy, shading the coffee bushes, which
can grow as high as 20 feet.2 The climate and shade provide a perfect
combination for growing Arabica and Robusta coffees, whose berries are
able to mature more slowly and fill out better, providing a stronger quality
coffee.3 In recent years, Suresh’s neighbors have begun to sell their crop
to international companies, such as Illy. But to do so, the retailers have
required that the farmers certify their coffee to a set of environmental
and social standards developed by nongovernmental entities in the global
North. Certification enables the retailer to market the coffee to consum-
ers in the global North as sustainable. Abiding by the standards would
require changes to the way Suresh grows his coffee and hires help to
harvest it. Certification would also involve expensive auditing to ensure
that Suresh’s farm maintains the sustainable practices. Suresh appreci-
ates the environmental and social costs of his business, but he also knows
he must provide for his family. And hometown pride is involved too:
Suresh and Dalia are troubled that the path to growing their business ap-
pears to require that they conform their practices to environmental and
social norms established by others, located far from their home in India.
For generations, Diego and his family have caught Patagonian
cod, just off the stormy coast of Argentina. Diego and his oldest son fish
with bottom tangle nets that flow from the back of their wooden boat
powered by an aged gasoline engine, which is essentially the same way
Diego fished with his father decades ago. In recent years, Diego has
noticed a decline in the number of fish he is able to catch, especially when
compared with when he fished with his father. Diego is still able to pro-
vide for his family, but he wonders about his son’s ability to follow in his
steps. Undoubtedly, there are more environmentally responsible ways for
Diego to fish. That environmental expertise exists within Argentina, but
gaps in public environmental governance infrastructure keep the neces-
sary information from reaching Diego. A few nongovernmental entities
offer environmental education and would certify Diego’s catch to a set of
environmental standards, but the entities are organized in the global
North, advance a global North perspective on the environment, and
1 S. Goppikrishna Warrier, Coorg Farmers are Now Growing Coffee that is Helping the
Environment, SCROLL.IN (Sept. 17, 2016), https://scroll.in/article/816322/coorg-farmers
-are-nowgrowing-coffee-that-is-helping-the-environment [https://perma.cc/477H-C66Y].
2 New South Wales Flora Online, Grevillea robusta A.Cunn. Ex R.Br., PLANTNET, http://
plantnet.rbgsyd.nsw.gov.au/cgi-bin/NSWfl.pl?page=nswfl&lvl=sp&name=Grevillea~ro
busta [https://perma.cc/WV45-6GC9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (giving the height of the
silver oak in meters; but 8–40 meters converts to about 26–131 feet).
3 Warrier, supra note 1.
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generally target large fisheries that supply fish to the international mar-
ketplace. Consequently, Diego is left to fend for himself.
Shade-grown coffee in Kodagu, India, may not appear to have much
in common with Patagonian cod, but appearances can be deceiving. Both
products are produced in the global South, generally by small- to medium-
sized enterprises. The products have ecological life cycles and leave ecologi-
cal footprints, which in the aggregate are significant.4 Buyers and consumers
appreciate the products’ qualitative attributes. The products’ environmen-
tal costs and benefits directly impact the global South and have ripple
effects in the global North.5 And—whether they know it or not—both pro-
ducers face a set of incentives to conform to voluntary sustainability stan-
dards (“VSS”) devised and administered in the global North.
Without a doubt, the need for environmentally responsible pro-
duction is critical. Collectively, we are exceeding the Earth’s ability to
provide for our consumption and assimilate our waste by 40 percent;
current levels of global development and consumption of natural resources
are unsustainable.6 Countries in the global North7 far outpace those in
the global South in their consumption of the Earth’s natural resources.8
While environmental movements and governance schemes have arisen
in the North, too often they thrust Northern environmental and economic
values upon the global South.9 Some have wisely called for the global
4 See Coffee’s Hidden Carbon Footprint, GLOBAL COFFEE REPORT (Feb. 2018), http://gcr
mag.com/technology/view/coffees-hidden-carbon-footprint [https://perma.cc/77TA-TKC6];
NORTH SEA FOUND., SEAS AT RISK: THE CARBON FOOTPRINT OF FISHERIES, https://energy
efficiency-fisheries.jrc.ec.europa.eu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=924c1ba8-94af-440d
-94cb-f9cb124d2d57&groupId=12762 [https://perma.cc/AK3W-3SDG].
5 See GLOBAL COFFEE REPORT, supra note 4.
6 Ruth Gordon, Unsustainable Development, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE GLOBAL SOUTH 68 (Shakwkat Alam et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2015).
7 Sumudu Atapattu & Carmen G. Gonzalez, The North-South Divide in International
Environmental Law: Framing the Issues, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE GLOBAL SOUTH 2 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2015)
(noting that the global North refers to “wealthy industrialized nations” such as the
United States, European Union members, Japan, and Australia; global South refers to
less wealthy nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America).
8 Gordon, supra note 6, at 68 (noting that the global North, where 20 percent of the earth’s
population live, consume “more than 80 per cent of the total global economic output”).
9 Atapattu & Gonzalez, supra note 7, at 1; M. Rafiqul Islam, History of the North-South
Divide in International Law: Colonial Discourses, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination,
in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 48 (Shawkat Alam et
al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2015) (noting that Southern states “perceive envi-
ronmentalism as a means of undermining their sovereignty and enabling Northern states
to gain access to Southern untapped resources”). See Gordon, supra note 6, at 56–58
(describing the development of environmentalism in the global North and South).
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North to critically examine its own development and consumption levels,
noting that it would be biophysically impossible to increase development
in the global South to the level enjoyed in the global North, and that
instead, the global North should reduce its “inflated ecological footprint
to create the ecological space for growth in the global South.”10
This Article makes a different appeal. In recent years, environ-
mental governance has grown to include private and public-private
governance schemes that incentivize producers to make more environ-
mentally responsible products and nudge consumers to buy them. Private
environmental governance occurs when nongovernmental actors engage
in conduct designed to accomplish traditional public government func-
tion.11 Public-private environmental governance results when governmental
and nongovernmental actors partner in accomplishing tasks typically left
to purely governmental actors.12 VSS, such as Rainforest Alliance and
the Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”), are prime examples of private
and public-private environmental governance.13 The entities are nongov-
ernmental, they set environmental and social standards for producers,
certify products and production processes that conform to the standards,
and audit those certified to ensure ongoing compliance.14 Most VSS include
a label that signals compliance with the VSS.15 Targets of VSS labels
include consumers and recently (and more significantly) businesses.16
But VSS paint with a broad brush. For example, smallholders like
Diego, the Argentine fisher noted above, face the same VSS as industrial
fisheries in the global North and have little hope of profitable compliance.17
Statistics show why this dynamic presents a key challenge. Globally,
10 Gordon, supra note 6, at 68.
11 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129,
146 (2013).
12 See id.
13 Kristin Komives & Amy Jackson, Introduction to Voluntary Sustainability Standards,
in VOLUNTARY STANDARD SYSTEMS: A CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6
(Carsten Schmitz Hoffmann et al. eds., 2014).
14 Axel Marx et al., Voluntary Sustainability Standards: An Overview, LEUVEN CTR. FOR
GLOB. GOVERNANCE STUD. 1–2, 12–13 (2015), https://ees.kuleuven.be/klimos/papers/marx
_2015_voluntary_sustainability_standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC5P-Z2DF].
15 Komives & Jackson, supra note 13, at 5.
16 Id.
17 See Aidenvironment, Including Smallholders in Biofuel Certification: Recommenda-
tions to Voluntary Sustainability Standards, SWISS FED. INST. OF TECH. 1–2 (2013),
https://energycenter.epfl.ch/files/content/sites/energy-center/files/projects/Bioenergy%20
Team/Recommendations%20on%20Smallholder%20Inclusiveness.pdf [https://perma.cc
/MP5T-8QNC].
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experts estimate that 31.4 percent of fish stocks are unsustainably fished;
58.1 percent are fully fished, meaning that 89.5 percent of fish stocks
cannot support any increase in production.18 Fishing is a widespread oc-
cupation: during 2014, 56.6 million people engaged in fishing worldwide,
84 percent of whom lived in Asia.19 VSS, such as the MSC, operate to
distinguish those producers that produce environmentally responsible
goods from those that do not.20 Currently, MSC certifies 12 percent of
global catch, and little of that is caught in the global South.21 The produc-
ers’ choice to certify their products is generally motivated by economic
concerns: Certification may lead to more efficient production processes,
price premiums, and greater access to markets.22 It may also reflect an
appreciation for the environment, preserving the coffee-bearing soil and
fish stock for themselves and generations to come.23 In an era where formal,
public environmental law, especially in the international context, has
become ossified, VSS provide a means of advancing environmental goals
by incentivizing producers and downstream retailers to supply the market
with environmentally responsible products through environmentally re-
sponsible processes.
VSS operate in international and domestic markets within the
global North and South, but the vast majority of VSS are organized in
18 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUA-
CULTURE 2016, 13 (2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5798e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DCL-MXKH].
The Food & Agricultural Organziation of the United Nations (FAO) is an intergovern-
mental organization representing 194 nations and the EU. What We Do, FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/about/what-we-do/en/ [https://perma.cc
/DG9S-3GR2] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (stating its strategic objectives include (1) “Help
eliminate hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition”; (2) “Make agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries more productive and sustainable”; (3) “Reduce rural poverty”; (4) “Enable inclusive
and efficient agricultural and food systems”; and (5) “Increase the resilience of livelihoods
to threats and crises.”).
19 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE, supra note 18, at 12.
20 Track a Fishery, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries
/@@search [https://perma.cc/DQ7F-79KB] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (reflecting three
certified fisheries operating off of the Argentine Coast).
21 MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, MSC GLOBAL IMPACTS REPORT 2017, 4 (2017), https://
www.msc.org/documents/environmental-benefits/global-impacts/msc-global-impacts-re
port-2017 [https://perma.cc/UL5P-YLT6].
22 See Allen Blackman & Jorge Riviera, Producer Level Benefits of Sustainability Certifi-
cation, 25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1176, 1177 (2011), https://business.gwu.edu/sites/g
/files/zaxdzs1611/f/downloads/Faculty_Rivera_Producer-Level-Benefits-Sustainability
-Certification.pdf [https://perma.cc/72PW-DRW8].
23 See Anna Carlson & Charles Palmer, A Qualitative Meta-synthesis of the Benefits of
Eco-labeling in Developing Countries, 127 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 129, 136 (2016).
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and operate from the global North.24 Predictably, the global North VSS
reflect global North-based environmental and economic priorities.25 As
global North retailers seek to market their own sustainability agendas,
they increasingly require members of their value chains to certify their
products, often to North-based VSS. For example, Walmart has launched
a Sustainability Index, which scores products based upon a variety of
social and environmental factors.26 Suppliers with top scores in a product
area receive a Sustainability Badge on their product.27 When, as in the
coffee industry, value chain producers are in the global South, the result
is that to participate in global value chains, global South producers such
as Suresh are compelled to certify to global North-based VSS.
This Article argues that the global South should manage its own
ecological footprint, in part, by generating its own public-private VSS.
Doing so would enable the global South to set and execute its own sustain-
able development agenda, striking a proper balance between environmental
and economic goals. In previous scholarship, I have argued that the regula-
tion of environmental marketing claims such as VSS, should conform to
Relational Integrity Regulation.28 VSS that spring from Relational Integ-
rity Regulation are reflexive, preference-directed, activate consumers’
personal norms, and focus on products and their production processes.29
Here I return to those principles, asserting that the global South VSS
would benefit from Relation Integrity Regulation. I note that while VSS
provide a potentially effective and efficient means of balancing and ad-
vancing environmental and economic goals, they are no panacea.30
24 See Philip Schleifer, Can voluntary sustainability standards survive in emerging
markets?, MONGABAY (Mar. 17, 2015), https://news.mongabay.com/2015/03/can-voluntary
-sustainability-standards-survive-in-emerging-markets/ [https://perma.cc/A6SR-LAP5].
25 See id.
26 Sustainability Index, WALMART, https://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/en
vironment-sustainability/sustainability-index-leaders-shop [https://perma.cc/3ZV9-RNUJ]
(last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
27 Sustainability Frequently Asked Questions, WALMART, https://corporate.walmart.com
/global-responsibility/environmental-sustainability/sustainability-leaders/sustainability-lead
ers-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/Y5AC-8KLL] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
28 See generally Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity Regulation: Nudging Consumers
Toward Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing Claims, 40 ENVTL. L. 1327
(2010) (asserting that the most effective environmental marketing claim regulation is
Relational Integrity Regulation. This species of regulation involves four attributes: it is
reflexive; it is preference-directed; it is aimed at activating consumers’ personal norms;
and it focuses on the product and its production process).
29 Id. at 1338, 1341.
30 See Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards
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Although VSS have been used for over twenty years, there has been little
empirical work done on their effectiveness. Those studies that have been
completed, especially those with counterfactuals and control groups, indi-
cate that VSS have produced mixed and sometimes adverse effects on
global South producers and the global South environment. That said, the
recent emergence of a few successful global South-based VSS suggests that
VSS may yet be a useful tool of environmental governance. Moreover,
when imbued with Relational Integrity Regulation principles, VSS could
be a particularly effective way for the global South to forge a balance be-
tween its competing interests in sustainability and economic development.
The Article continues as follows: Part I provides additional back-
ground information on VSS. Part II reveals the impacts of established VSS
on the global South and its producers. Part III recommends that stakehold-
ers in the global South develop their own VSS, rooted in effective envi-
ronmental governance principles. The last section concludes this Article.
Certification and Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 154 (2013) (discussing the
economics of VSS and finding that VSS, though not without fault, are an effective means
of delivering “desired consumer information and facilitating trade to fulfill consumer
preferences”); Jeffrey J. Minneti, Is it Too Easy Being Green? A Behavioral Economics
Approach to Determining Whether to Regulate Environmental Marketing Claims, 55 LOY.
L. REV. 653, 667–77, 690–91 (2009) (discussing the application of behavioral economics
to environmental marketing schemes, and the regulation of the schemes and finding that
regulation of environmental marketing claims is appropriate because absent regulation,
the market alone is unable to drive false claims from products); Cecilia Soler et al., How
Can High-Biodiversity Coffee Make it to the Mainstream Market? The Performativity of
Voluntary Sustainability Standards and Outcomes for Coffee Diversification, ENVTL.
MGMT. 230, 230–31 (2016) (discussing the economic and environmental benefits of coffee
certification); Allison Loconto & Cora Dankers, Impact of international voluntary standards
on smallholder market participation in developing countries—A review of the literature,
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS 11–14 (2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3682e
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF2Q-PB8G] (describing potential economic and environmental
impacts of VSS); The Impacts of Private Standards on Producers in Developing Countries:
Literature Review Series on the Impacts of Private Standards—Part II, INT’L TRADE CTR.
10–22 (2011) [hereinafter ITC Study], http://www.intracen.org/The-Impacts-of-Private
-Standards-on-Producers-in-Developing-Countries/ [https://perma.cc/B2WN-G7VQ] (dis-
cussing the economic and environmental impacts of VSS, as the International Trade
Centre is a joint venture of the WTO and UN and provides trade related technical as-
sistance through the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD)).
For a perspective on how international environmental law’s evolution has impacted India
and the Indian government’s efforts to ensure its indigenous and poor populations have
a voice in environmental governance, see Kishan Khoday & Usha Natarajan, Fairness
and International Environmental Law from Below: Social Movements and Legal Trans-
formation in India, 25 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 415 (2012).
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I. A PRIMER ON VSS
That VSS have reached into rural India but not coastal Argentina
is a result of the history of VSS and their utility as a market-based
environmental governance tool. This Part provides a sense of context for
the development of VSS, describes their theoretical utility in the market-
place and the environment, and discusses the recent proliferation of VSS.
A. VSS in Context
Efforts to address the unsustainable nature of our current con-
sumption patterns are myriad, arising from public and private sources
operating in domestic and international arenas. For example, in 2015,
the United Nations adopted a set of seventeen Sustainable Development
Goals, which include the following:
Ensure access to water and sanitation for all;31
Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns;32
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its im-
pacts;33
31 Goal 6: Ensure access to water and sanitation for all, UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE
DEV. GOALS, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/water-and-sanitation/ [https://
perma.cc/BRC2-7ZGZ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (stating that targets include improving
water quality by reducing pollution and increasing recycling and reusing of water; im-
proving efficiency of water use; protecting and restoring water ecosystems; and expanding
developing country capacities for efficient water use).
32 Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns, UNITED NATIONS
SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-con
sumption-production/ [https://perma.cc/MM4N-UYQX] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (stating
that targets include achieving “sustainable management and efficient use of natural re-
sources”; by 2020 achieving “the environmentally sound management of chemicals and
all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks,
and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their adverse
impacts on human health and the environment”; encouraging “companies, especially
large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sus-
tainability information into their reporting cycle”; ensuring “that people everywhere have
the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in
harmony with nature”; supporting “developing countries to strengthen their scientific and
technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and
production”; and promoting mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-
related planning and management in least developed countries and small island develop-
ing states, including focusing on women, youth, and local and marginalized communities).
33 Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, UNITED NATIONS
SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change-2/
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Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine
resources;34
Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt
and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss and;35
[https://perma.cc/F6MT-KFQ4] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (stating that targets include:
integrating “climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning”;
and improving “education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on
climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning”).
34 Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources, UNITED
NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/oceans/
[https://perma.cc/5XTL-ZXB3] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (stating that targets include:
“By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular
from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution. By 2020, sus-
tainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse
impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration
in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans; Minimize and address the impacts of
ocean acidification, including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels; By 2020,
effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management
plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can
produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics”;
and “[p]rovide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets”).
35 Goal 15: Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degra-
dation, halt biodiversity loss, UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, http://www.un
.org/sustainabledevelopment/biodiversity/ [https://perma.cc/3RTB-YBZ4] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2018) (stating that targets include ensuring “the conservation, restoration and
sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in
particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under
international agreements”; promoting “the implementation of sustainable management
of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially
increase afforestation and reforestation globally”; combating “desertification, restor[ing]
degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and
striv[ing] to achieve a land degradation-neutral world”; ensuring “the conservation of
mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to
provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development”; taking “urgent and sig-
nificant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity
and, by 2020, protect[ing] and prevent[ing] the extinction of threatened species”; promoting
“fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources
and promot[ing] appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed”; taking
“urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and
address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products”; introducing “measures to
prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on
land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species”; integrating “eco-
system and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes,
poverty reduction strategies and accounts”; “mobiliz[ing] and significantly increas[ing]
financial resources from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and eco-
systems”; mobilizing “significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance
sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries
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Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable develop-
ment.36
In an effort to incentivize producers’ environmentally responsible
practices and inform consumers of the same, the United States and Euro-
pean Union have both launched VSS, which include the product labels
Energy Star and EU Flower.37 Other governments, nongovernmental
organizations (“NGOs”), and private firms have also launched VSS. Eco-
label Index, a global directory of VSS that include labels, lists 464 ecolabels
from 199 countries in 25 different industries.38
VSS share the following attributes: (1) they are not legally bind-
ing; (2) they direct organizational conduct, such as that of producers, not
individuals; (3) they focus on social and/or environmental issues and are
not exclusively technical; and (4) they have a governance structure that
involves setting standards, certifying members, auditing members for
compliance, and resolving disputes.39
Market demand for ecolabled products has resulted in free-riding,
as some in the field make intentionally false or deceptive claims about their
products, leading to claims of greenwashing.40 In response, governments
to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation”; and enhancing
“global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, in-
cluding by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood
opportunities”).
36 Goal 17: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development, UNITED NATIONS
SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/
[https://perma.cc/KCJ8-3TV5] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (outlining the following targets:
“Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building
in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable develop-
ment goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation”;
“Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-
stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and
financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in
all countries, in particular developing countries”; and “Encourage and promote effective
public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourc-
ing strategies of partnerships”).
37 See ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/ [https://perma.cc/29DT-3KYC] (last
visited Nov. 17, 2018); Environment: EU Ecolabel, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environ
ment/ecolabel/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/UU2C-XS3D] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
38 ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ [https://perma.cc/7MX9-HTVJ] (last
visited Nov. 17, 2018).
39 See Komives & Jackson, supra note 13, at 3–5; Marx et al., supra note 14, at 1–2, 12–13.
40 August Rick, Greenwashing: The ‘Eco-Friendly’ Scam Wining Over China’s 1.3B Consumer
Marketplace, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/augustrick/2017/10
/26/greenwashingthe-eco-friendly-scam-winning-over-chinas-1-3b-consumermarketplace
/#26a8446dacfb [https://perma.cc/9B3Z-YF6B].
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have taken action. For example, the U.S. proscribes false or deceptive
ecolabels,41 and the U.S.’s Federal Trade Commission has promulgated
the Green Guides, which provide guidance to those seeking to mark their
goods with environmental labels and claims.42 The Guides are designed
to keep marketers from making false or deceptive claims about their
products by offering definitions of commonly used environmental terms
such as compostable, recyclable, and biodegradable.43 Should a marketer
use a defined term in a manner inconsistent with the definitions pro-
vided in the Green Guides, the Green Guides provide some protection
from sanction under Section 5.44
The proliferation of labels and the potential for greenwashing has
also impacted the development of VSS, by creating market demand for
independent, third-party certification of product labels and claims.45 Certi-
fication of products flowing in international commerce has generated
trade concerns as the VSS could be used as a pretext for trade barriers,
inappropriately restricting market access.46
In response, the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) 1994 Minis-
terial Decision on Trade and the Environment created a new committee—
the Committee on Trade and the Environment (“CTE”).47 In 2001, the Doha
Ministerial Declaration included environmental labelling and standard
setting in the CTE’s work program, charging it as follows48:
We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in
pursuing work on all items on its agenda within its current
terms of reference, to give particular attention to:
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
42 16 C.F.R. 260 (1999).
43 Id. See Minneti, supra note 30, at 657–67 (2009) (discussing the structure and function
of the Green Guides).
44 16 C.F.R. 260.1(a) (stating the Green Guides “do not confer any rights on any person and
do not operate to bind the FTC or the public. The Commission, however, can take action un-
der the FTC Act if a marketer makes an environmental claim inconsistent with the guides.”).
45 See, e.g., Ecolabels and Certificates Help Consumers Make Sustainable Choices, UPM
GROUP, http://www.upm.com/Responsibility/Product-stewardship/Environmental-labels
-certificates/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc /66BR-3945] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
46 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201, https://www.wto
.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm [https://perma.cc/B9NH-SNQU] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2018) (stating that members agree that technical regulations and standards should
be an obstacle to international trade).
47 The Committee on Trade and Environment, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4ZR-B4QJ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
48 Labeling, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e
/labelling_e.htm [https://perma.cc/TJ8B-2SFQ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
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(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access,
especially in relation to developing countries, in particular
the least-developed among them, and those situations in
which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions
and distortions would benefit trade, the environment and
development;
(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and
(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes.49
The Committee serves as a forum for information sharing and information
gathering. For example, at the November 1, 2017 meeting, representatives
from Peru presented on best practices for managing polychlorinated bi-
phenyls (“PCBs”) used in mining equipment, demonstrating how public-
private partnerships can be effective in dealing with environmental
issues.50 The WTO Secretariat discussed the latest updates to the Envi-
ronmental Database, which tracks members’ notifications to the WTO re-
garding, among other topics, environmental regulatory measures that
impact trade.51 Two WTO intergovernmental agreements, the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade52 (“TBT”) and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of International Property Rights (“TRIPS”),53 speak to
members’ public and private efforts to regulate through VSS.
B. Costs and Benefits of VSS
This Section focuses on the economics of VSS, framing them as a
potential market-based environmental governance tool. From a demand
49 WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#32.3 [https://
perma.cc/NG8E-UP7B] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
50 WTO members share latest information on national environmental measures (Nov. 1,
2017), WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/envir_01nov17_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/9CBZ-F3KE].
51 CTE, Environmental Database, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e
/envdb_e.htm [https://perma.cc/XYZ3-4TZC] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). In 2015, the
period the Secretariat reported on at the November 2017 meeting, the TBT triggered 61
percent of all notifications received, which was consistent with previous years. For
additional information about the WTO’s work on trade and the environment, see Trade
and Environment, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/J7D8-VAW4] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
52 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 46.
53 WTO Legal Texts, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs
[https://perma.cc/6TZS-CMYZ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
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perspective, some consumers and businesses seek environmentally respon-
sible goods.54 The demand for environmentally responsible goods must be
sufficiently strong, in the aggregate, to warrant producers’ attention.55
In some industries, consumer and business demand has been cultivated
by social movement campaigns and NGOs that shed light on the environ-
mental harms producers were causing.56 Initially the movements promoted
“buycotts,” that named and shamed producers, but the movements and
NGOs then turned to recognizing producers with strong environmental
practices through certification.57
Having recognized a critical mass of demand, producers use envi-
ronmentally responsible processes to make environmentally responsible
products.58 Through their certification and auditing functions, VSS provide
a set of environmental best practice standards to which producers can con-
form their products and processes.59 Pairing consumers who demand envi-
ronmentally responsible products with the producers who make and sell
them is costly because while producers may have good information about
their products’ environmental benefits, consumers do not, triggering cre-
dence costs for consumers.60 VSS correct this information asymmetry be-
cause they provide consumers with standard setting, enforcement schemes,
and product labels that signal the products’ conformity with the stan-
dards.61 Thus, when a consumer purchasing coffee in a grocery store faces
shelves lined with coffee producers’ products, VSS labels, such as Rainforest
Alliance or UTZ, direct the consumer to environmentally responsible
coffees.62 The labels may also shed light on environmental issues associated
with the product, thereby building demand for the certified products.63
54 Roberts, supra note 30, at 117.
55 Id. at 121.
56 TIM BARTLEY ET AL., LOOKING BEHIND THE LABEL: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE CONSCI-
ENTIOUS CONSUMER 91–95 (2015) (discussing the evolution of FSC forestry and forest
product certifications); Axel Marx & Jan Wouters, Competition and Cooperation in the
Market of Voluntary Sustainability Standards (Ku Leuven Working Paper No. 135, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2431191 [https://perma.cc/X8RT
-HWSQ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (noting that NGO boycotts and reputation production
were the “main incentive” for establishing environmental VSS).
57 BARTLEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 92.
58 Roberts, supra note 30, at 117.
59 See David E. Adelman & Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and Private Environmental
Governance, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 709, 721 (2017).
60 Roberts, supra note 30, at 122–23. For a discussion of environmental credence costs,
see Minneti, supra note 30, at 670.
61 Roberts, supra note 30, at 124–25; Adelman & Austin, supra note 59, at 721.
62 Roberts, supra note 30, at 118–21.
63 Id. at 121–22.
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Economists characterize the benefits to VSS members as “club goods”
and “private goods” that produce public goods.64 Club goods are those that
inure to VSS members by virtue of their participation in the VSS—they
receive an enhanced reputation because they are engaging in environmen-
tally responsible conduct.65 Private goods are the prices VSS members can
charge because of their conformity to the VSS.66 Should the consumer
purchase the certified good, the product’s price must be acceptable to the
consumer and the producer.67 Ideally, the price will reflect those costs
associated with the product’s intrinsic production costs, its environmen-
tally responsible attributes, and the information costs associated with
certification to the VSS.68 In theory, steady consumer demand will lead
to the steady supply of environmentally responsible goods, which in turn,
leads to environmental benefits.69 These are the public goods, produced
as a result of the producer-consumer exchange.70
In addition to facilitating market-based transactions—and because
they set environmental norms through their standards, audit producers to
ensure compliance with the standards, and facilitate consumer purchase
of environmentally responsible goods—VSS are essentially a form of
private environmental regulation.71 VSS governance fills gaps left by the
failures of formal public domestic and international governments.72 The
failures arise in three situations: (1) jurisdictional disjunction—when
nations lack the power to govern a natural resource because the resource
64 GRAEME AULD, CONSTRUCTING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: THE RISE AND EVOLUTION OF
FORESTRY, COFFEE, AND FISHERIES CERTIFICATION 13–14 (Yale Univ. Press 2014).
65 Id. at 14.
66 Id.
67 Roberts, supra note 30, at 122.
68 Id. at 121 (noting that when the return on the investment of environmentally respon-
sible practices is not strong enough, producers may choose to reallocate the use of their
resources, choosing to supply the market with other goods). See BARTLEY ET AL., supra
note 56, at 108–09 (discussing Indonesian farmers’ choices to shift from certified timber
production to palm oil production, resulting in significant deforestation).
69 Roberts, supra note 30, at 131–32. But see Cathy Roheim Wessells et al., Product Certi-
fication and Ecolabelling for Fisheries Sustainability 18, FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER
(2001) (noting that should consumer demand for environmentally responsible goods be
smaller than its supply, then VSS may lead to increased prices on goods that are not
environmentally responsible).
70 AULD, supra note 64, at 14.
71 Roberts, supra note 30, at 125–29.
72 Id. at 134–40; Adelman & Austin, supra note 59, at 714 (“The intensifying ideological
opposition to national environmental regulations and multilateral treaties has elevated
the importance of private governance. Almost daily, the prospects of government responses
to environmental and other global problems appears more remote.”).
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does not exist exclusively within its border, such as migrating wildlife;
(2) jurisdictional overlap—when multiple nations have power over a re-
source, but because each is self-interested none are able to collaboratively
regulate the resource; and (3) regulatory fragmentation—when govern-
mental entities compete with one another for authority over shared land
use rights, resulting in local rules that compete and conflict with one
another and lead to a race to the bottom in the rigor of the rules.73
As noted above, when interest in environmentally responsible
products began to grow, producers started affixing their own labels to
their products, promoting the products’ environmental attributes, which
were frequently unverified and often false or misleading.74 Subsequent
cries of greenwashing triggered another use of VSS, third-party certifica-
tion schemes that legitimized the claims about the products.75
Theoretical models suggest positive and negative impacts from
the growth in VSS. Among the positive impacts, vertical differentiation of
VSS may result in the market entry of VSS with less rigorous standards.76
Those VSS will certify producers that seek certification but cannot afford
the costs associated with more rigorous standards.77 This same group of
VSS is likely to be more sensitive to local conditions affecting producers,
which may result in stronger market uptake of the VSS, and as a result
more widespread environmental impact.78 Further differentiation of VSS
could lead to a stepwise improvement of lowest performers.79 At the other
end of the spectrum, more rigorous VSS can signal high performing envi-
ronmental products and processes, supplying market demand for products
that are highly environmentally responsible.80 In theory, an increase in
the number of certification and audit companies working with VSS should
lead to a decrease in producers’ costs for VSS certification and audits.81
As more VSS enter the market, more certification and audit companies
73 Roberts, supra note 30, at 134–36.
74 BARTLEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 92.
75 Id.
76 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
LABELLING AND INFORMATION SCHEMES 9 (May 2016), https://www.oecd.org/env/policy-per
sectives-environmental-labelling-and-information-schemes.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3J4
-8C8X] [hereinafter OECD REPORT].
77 Roberts, supra note 30, at 114.
78 OECD REPORT, supra note 76.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Andrew Prag, Thomas Lyon & Aimee Russillo, Multiplication of Environmental Label-
ling and Information Schemes (ELIS): Implications for Environment and Trade 32 (OECD
Environment Working Papers, No. 106, 2016).
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will be needed to implement the standards. The influx of such firms would
drive down costs of certification of audits, for the benefit of producers.
Negative effects include difficulty in selecting VSS because pro-
ducers do not know precisely which VSS consumers will value and which
VSS are most appropriate for the producers’ production environment. Hori-
zontal intensification may require a producer to participate in multiple
VSS to achieve sufficient market access, which causes increases in enroll-
ment and compliance costs.82 The extension of VSS into carbon or envi-
ronmental footprinting will likely lead to an increase in costs that will be
disproportionately felt by producers in developing countries.83 Assessment
of product footprints requires a calculation of the product’s life cycle, which
in turn requires significant data collection and evaluation, potentially ex-
pensive changes to the product and/or production processes, and more
expensive auditing measures.84 Such cost increases will more signifi-
cantly affect producers in developing countries, who have access to fewer
resources to start with than those in developed or emerging economies.
Theoretical models of VSS proliferation posit that the increase in
VSS in a given product category may result in a dilution of environmental
standards.85 Though their mission may be to protect and conserve envi-
ronmental resources, VSS are also businesses that seek market survival.
As new VSS firms enter the market, each seeks to increase its market
share of certified products. In markets that will tolerate many certifiers,
such as coffee, the pursuit of certified products will lead VSS to reduce their
environmental standards, making certification easier for producers.86
The resulting market would be one that is vertically differentiated, with
firms racing each other to lower certification standards in an effort to in-
crease their market share of producers, thereby ensuring their survival.87
While producers may find it easier to certify their products, the overall
environmental impact of certification would be reduced. And because
most environmentally labeled products are credence goods, consumers
are not likely to be aware that there is disparity in the products’ environ-
mental impacts, which reduces incentives for producers to aim for the
greatest possible favorable environmental impact from their products.
82 See OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 9.
83 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 32.
84 See Simone Manfredi et al., PRODUCT ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT (PEF) GUIDE, EUR.
COMM’N JOINT RES. CTR. 5 (July 12, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/pdf/foot
print/PEF%20methodology%20final%20draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y3B -T293].
85 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 32; OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 9–10.
86 Roberts, supra note 30, at 118–21.
87 Adelman & Austin, supra note 59, at 733; AULD, supra note 64, at 14.
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In theory, the proliferation of standards and their labels may con-
fuse consumers, who will face retail shelves with similar products bear-
ing different environmental labels.88 Such confusion defeats the purpose
of the labels, which exist, in part, to signal to consumers those products
that are environmentally responsible.89 As a result, consumer confusion
may negatively impact consumer demand for labeled products because
consumers may grow to distrust the labels, and consumers may be less
likely to purchase the same goods over time.90 Any such change in con-
sumer demand would adversely impact producers’ supply of the goods
and any price premium they may be able to reap from participating in
VSS.91 Having a sense of context for the development of VSS and their
theoretical economic utility, the Article now turns to the actual marketplace
for VSS, describing their growth in number, type, and sophistication over
the last two decades.
C. The Proliferation of VSS
The exceptional growth of VSS since the 1990s is widely recog-
nized and has occurred in the number of VSS schemes and the area
certified by VSS.92 As noted above, Ecolabel Index lists 463 ecolabels in
199 countries and 25 industries.93 VSS schemes mainly operate in devel-
oped countries; in many least developed countries no VSS are active.94
88 Andreas Rasche, Voluntary Standards as Enablers and Impediments in HANDBOOK OF RE-
SEARCH ON SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION 23 (Lucia A. Reisch & John Thorgerson eds., 2015).
89 Adelman & Austin, supra note 59, at 720.
90 Id. at 725–26; Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 30 (noting that consumers perceive
self-declared claims in the seafood industry to be “misleading or unverifiable”).
91 Adelman & Austin, supra note 59, at 725–26.
92 OECD REPORT, supra note 76; Julia Lemoud et al., The State of Sustainable Markets—
Statistics and Emerging Trends, INT’L TRADE CTR. xii (2017), http://www.intracen.org
/publication/The-State-of-Sustainable-Markets-2017-Statistics-and-Emerging-Trends/
[https://perma.cc/VNM2-3ZTJ]; Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 32; Marx &
Wouters, supra note 56; Adelman & Austin, supra note 59; Thomas Dietz & Jennie
Auffenberg, The Efficacy of Private Voluntary Certification Schemes: A Governance Costs
Approach (ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies No. 39/ 2014, Oct. 22, 2014).
93 ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 38.
94 Axel Marx & Jan Wouters, Is Everybody on Board? Voluntary Sustainability Standards
and Green Restructuring, LEUVEN CTR. FOR GLOB. GOVERNANCE STUD. 511, 515 (2015).
The authors examined the use of four leading VSS: FSC, PEFC, SAI, and GLOBALG.A.P.
Id. at 513–14. They mapped the uptake of the standards in two measurement waves,
conducted in 2010 and 2013. Id. at 514. EU member states account for 29 percent of
active VSS. Sixty-four percent of private environmental VSS operate in a single country.
Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 21. The authors note that a full understanding
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Correspondingly, a majority of certified entities are based in developed
countries; few are based in developing countries.95 In the forestry context,
VSS are primarily adopted in the global North as opposed to the global
South, creating market access barriers for global South producers who seek
to participate in global value chains that require VSS certification.96 Global
North producers are accustomed to complying with regulations and as a
result, the gap between their current practice and compliance with VSS is
relatively small, when compared to producers in the global South, whose
practices may require considerable revision to comply with VSS.97 Further,
even if the standardization gap is not significant for global South producers,
the investment in time and money necessary to complete the certification
process and comply with audits may be too high for global South producers,
given that they may not receive a price premium on their efforts.98
Trends in the growth of the number of environmental VSS include
the following: Government operated schemes are a minority.99 Over the
past twenty years, most VSS are a product of non-state actors, including
NGOs and private firms, and private firms have created more VSS than
NGOs.100 Business-to-consumer schemes represent 70 percent of all
environmental VSS, indicating that businesses are driving the genera-
tion of VSS.101 Firms are now shifting away from biodiversity to climate
change VSS.102 Growth in the number of VSS can also be described as
intensification and extensification.103 Intensification characterizes the
proliferation of business-to-consumer VSS that certify the same sectors
on the same issues and use an ecolabel to indicate certification.104 For
example, certifiers of environmentally responsible coffee production in-
clude: 4C Association, Bird Friendly Coffee, C.A.F.E. Practices, Rainforest
of the impact of private environmental VSS requires an understanding of the impact of
private environmental VSS originating in one country but certifying producers in another;
to date there is no reliable data that quantify that impact. Of the 64 percent originating
and operating in the same country, 28 percent are in the United States. Prag, Lyon &
Russillo, supra note 81, at 21. Annex B of the report includes a graph depicting the coun-
tries of origin for private environmental VSS.
95 Marx & Wouters, supra note 94, at 515.
96 Id. at 517.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 6.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.; see also Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 19.
104 Id.
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Alliance Certified, Sustainable Agricultural Network, and UTZ Certified.105
Intensification growth can be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal intensifi-
cation refers to the emergence of new VSS that target environmental
impacts not covered by existing VSS.106 For example, among the coffee
certifiers mentioned above, Rainforest Alliance Certified, established in
1992, certifies coffee produced in compliance with comprehensive envi-
ronmental and social standards, and Bird Friendly Coffee, established in
1998, certifies coffee produced with best practices in shade management
and protection of bird habitats.107 Vertical VSS growth refers to the dif-
ferentiation in standards based on the rigor of the certification scheme.
For example, 4C Association is designed to attract the worst producers and
incrementally facilitate their improvement,108 whereas C.A.F.E. Practices
sets a higher level of environmental performance for certification and
includes a life-cycle analysis.109 Extensification refers to those VSS that
conduct life-cycle analysis of products, measuring, for example a product’s
carbon footprint or its environmental footprint.110 Carbon footprinting is
concerned with the product’s life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions.111
Environmental footprinting includes a life-cycle analysis of additional
product impacts, such as the impact on water and biodiversity.112
In terms of area certified, certified cotton farms increased 252.8
percent from 2011–2015, with a 46 percent increase from 2014–2015.113
Certified coffee farms increased 63.3 percent over the same period; certi-
fied forests increased 61 percent from 2008–2015.114 Organic certified
products cover the largest area at 1.1 percent of all agricultural land
worldwide.115 Approximately 10 percent of global forests are certified;116
The Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (“PEFC”) holds
the highest share of certified global forest area, at 6.1 percent.117 Not
105 ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 38 (survey of ecolabels using “coffee” as a search term in
the Ecolabel Index).
106 See Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 19.
107 ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 38.
108 OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 8.
109 ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 38; see Melissa Thomas et al., C.A.F.E. Practices Results
Assessment: Fiscal Years 2011–2012, CONSERVATION INT’L (2011–2012).
110 OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 22.
111 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 19–20.
112 Id. at 20.
113 Lemoud et al., supra note 92, at 4.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 5.
116 Id. at 8.
117 Id. at 6.
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surprisingly, a VSS is more likely to increase certifications if its sustain-
ability standards are weak, when compared with competing VSS.118
Some industries have seen a convergence or harmonization of VSS
in addition to or instead of a proliferation of VSS. Convergence arises when
VSS promote the mutual recognition of one another’s standards as roughly
equivalent.119 For example, USDA Organic and EU Organic mutually
recognize one another as do Environmental Choice New Zealand and
Thai Green Label.120 Convergence of private VSS is highly uncommon,
reflecting the competitive, uncoordinated, and fragmented nature of the
intensification of VSS.121 Harmonization occurs when individual VSS
entities adopt codes of best practices.122 Sustainable Agricultural Net-
work/Rainforest Alliance’s and UTZ’s adoption of International Social
and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (“ISEAL”) Alliance’s
Code of Good Practice is a prime example of harmonization.123
The proliferation of private VSS can be attributed to consumer
demand for more environmentally responsible products and processes,
government’s failure to respond to that demand, NGOs’ interest in and
capacity for responding to consumer demand, and businesses’ interest in
marketing their environmentally responsible products and processes.124
An empirical study of VSS considered (1) the extent to which VSS support
118 Dietz & Auffenberg, supra note 92, at 16 (studying the spread of coffee certification by
examining three components of coffee VSS: sustainability, economic, and enforcement
standards). Sustainability standards included environmentally specific standards, such
as the use of pesticides and fertilizers, water conservation, and ecosystem and wildlife
protections. Id. at 11. That the strictness of a sustainability standard was directly related
to the spread of the standard was explained by the inference that stricter sustainability
standards generated higher implementation costs, which could not be fully compensated
by the market. Id. at 17. Interestingly, the authors found that the rigor of enforcement
standards, which included auditing procedures and compliance plans, had “no absolutely
negative impact” on the spread of coffee certification, id. at 16, suggesting that the most
significant costs of VSS uptake are on the front end of the standard.
119 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 19–20.
120 Marx & Wouters, supra note 94, at 17.
121 Id.
122 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 19–20.
123 See ISEAL Members, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/about-iseal/iseal
-members [https://perma.cc/46HR-R4KA] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). ISEAL Alliance has
set codes for standard setting, assessing impacts, and assurance with which members
must comply. For information about the Codes, see ISEAL Codes of Good Practice, ISEAL
ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/defining-credibility/codes-of-good-prac
tice [https://perma.cc/Z7PM-5RLJ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
124 See Roberts, supra note 30, at 129–40; Minneti, supra note 30, at 29–43 (describing
non-state actors’ VSS schemes).
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producers and (2) the geographic availability of VSS.125 The study found
that VSS tend to provide more support for producers when the VSS are full
members of ISEAL, headquartered in an Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (“OECD”) country, have been in existence for
longer than average, and engage producers and buyers in management of
the VSS.126 VSS variables that reflect no predictive relationship for pro-
ducer support include whether the VSS were public (connected to a formal
government scheme) or for-profit and private. Not surprisingly, VSS avail-
ability is significantly and positively correlated to country level GDP.127
The more wealthy a country, the more likely the country’s markets include
high-quality goods touting sustainability benefits.128 The demand for
such goods incentivizes profit-maximizing certifiers and VSS to enter the
markets and certify the goods.129 Markets where firms are more competi-
tive will have more VSS available to them.130 The study defined firm com-
petition in terms of the firm’s ability to effectively and efficiently manage
its resources as expressed through its use of indicators to gauge best
practices.131 The indicators included use of a bank account, email, and the
capacity to engage in high-volume production.132
The proliferation of VSS is clear evidence of consumers’ demand
for private VSS.133 Among European consumers, 54 percent seek out en-
vironmentally responsible goods, and 84 percent strongly consider the
125 Matteo Fiorini et al., Suppliers’ Access to Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS)
(European University Institute Working Paper 1, 2017) [hereinafter Access to VSS].
126 Id. at 16–17. The authors conducted an empirical study of approximately 1000 data
points on 180 VSS arising from 80 sectors. Id. at 6. All of the VSS studied covered at least
one sustainability area (economic and management, ethics and integrity, environment,
quality management system, social), and had a fixed governance structure and credible
audit system. Id. at 6. The information was assimilated into a database called the Sustain-
ability Map. Sustainability Map, ITC, http://sustainabilitymap.org/home [https://perma.cc
/C5BJ-Z855] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). The authors defined support. Access to VSS,
supra note 125, at 11. OECD countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States. Members and partners, OECD, http://www.oecd
.org/about/membersandpartners/ [https://perma.cc/9C8K-UU9C] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
127 Access to VSS, supra note 125, at 21.
128 Id. at 20.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 22.
131 Id. at 21.
132 Id.
133 See ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 38.
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environment in their purchase decisions.134 As noted above, state actors’
failures, at the domestic and international level, to require and/or incen-
tivize producers to generate environmentally responsible products in
response to consumer demand-motivated social movements and NGOs
to first boycott and then later develop their own private VSS that could
name those producers who produced environmentally responsible prod-
ucts and shame those that did not.135
Firms, including producers, distributors, and retailers, are now
also participating in VSS governance through the adoption of third-party
VSS or the creation of their own VSS. From an internal perspective, a
firm’s adoption of a VSS scheme can enable the firm to secure long-term
supply of resources and construct barriers to entry for rival firms.136 With
the advent of global value chains, firms are now seeking to certify their
entire supply chain, rather than a single ingredient, product, or process.137
External demand may also lead a firm to pursue certified products. Such
demands include pressure from investors; non-consumer buyers, such as
distributors; and insurers who perceive VSS as a risk reduction tool.138
In addition, the adoption of VSS may protect the firm from resource scarcity
and may preempt future governmental regulation.139 A key benefit of
private VSS schemes is their flexibility. Through a private VSS, the firm
can adopt standards that fit its supply chain needs, thereby governing its
conduct without the interference of state actors’ schemes, which may
prove less flexible and more costly to the firm. Starbucks and Nespresso
are examples of these trends because each has developed its own sus-
tainability programs and contracted with third-party certifiers to validate
compliance with the schemes. C.A.F.E. Practices is Starbucks’ pro-
gram.140 Starbucks has contracted with SCS Global Services (“SCS”) to
certify its producers’ compliance with environmentally sound practices.141
Similarly, Nespresso has contracted with Rainforest Alliance to ensure
the coffee it sells is sustainably farmed.142
134 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 18.
135 Marx & Wouters, supra note 94, at 9–10; Dietz & Auffenberg, supra note 92, at 2;
Adelman & Austin, supra note 59, at 13.
136 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 18; Marx & Wouters, supra note 94, at 10.
137 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 18.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 18; Marx & Wouters, supra note 94, at 10.
140 Ethical Sourcing Coffee, STARBUCKS, https://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/sourc
ing/coffee [https://perma.cc/W6SB-GF4N] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
141 Starbucks C.A.F.E. Practices, SCS GLOBAL SERVICES, https://www.scsglobalservices
.com/starbucks-cafe-practices [https://perma.cc/92WY-GCUD] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
142 Teaming Up on Certification: The Secret to Sustainable Quality, NESPRESSO, https://
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This Part has provided background information on the develop-
ment of VSS and the costs and benefits associated with VSS, and this
Part has described the recent growth in the number, types, and complex-
ity of VSS. One might conclude that the growth in VSS is evidence that
they have accomplished their potential utility by leading to producers’
enhanced environmental and social welfare practices and resulted in
actual environmental benefit and social change. As the next Part details,
such is not necessarily the case, especially in the global South.
II. IMPACT OF VSS ON GLOBAL SOUTH PRODUCERS AND
ENVIRONMENTS
In spite of the fact that VSS have been operating in the global South
for decades, the depth of research on VSS in the global South is relatively
shallow. This Part first summarizes studies that have focused on VSS’s
effect on producers; it then turns to studies evaluating VSS’s impacts on
the global South environment. Results of the producer-focused studies
are context-specific, but some general trends emerge: global South pro-
ducers, especially smallholder producers, see little monetary benefit from
certification; market access is the most widespread benefit of VSS partic-
ipation, but smallholder producers generally cannot participate on their
own—instead, they must join producer organizations, partnering with other
producers to spread the costs of certification. Certification has taught
some producers more efficient and environmentally responsible produc-
tion processes. Public government can facilitate VSS uptake among pro-
ducers. In spite of how integral producers are to the success of VSS, VSS
rarely permit producers to participate in decision-making.
Environment-focused studies are fewer in number than producer-
focused studies; their results are also highly context-specific, varying by
global South nation and industry. General trends include some positive
changes in producer practices that may lead to environmental benefits,
such as the use of more environmentally responsible chemicals and
better use of water; however, evidence of direct environmental benefit
from VSS is exceedingly thin, with only one study suggesting that coffee
farmers’ practices led to an increase in biodiversity, and with several
studies showing that forestry certification had no or had adverse impacts
on deforestation.
www.nespresso.com/ch/en/our-choices/sustainable-coffee-quality/the-secret-to-sustain
able-and-quality-coffee?utm_id=6a26af9d-9d10-4647-92%E2%80%A6 [https://perma.cc
/HYB5-R4EG] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
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A. IMPACT OF VSS ON PRODUCERS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Consideration of the impact of VSS on developing country produc-
ers is important because it is the producers whose uptake of the VSS gets
the process started and the producers bear most of the risks and costs
associated with VSS.143 Because VSS are by their nature voluntary, pro-
ducers must be incentivized to seek and maintain certification of their
products. Incentives generally arise from a cost-benefit analysis drawn
from short- and long-term assessments of certification.144 Certification
costs include investment in equipment, time spent learning new prac-
tices, time spent working through the certification paperwork, paying for
third-party audits, and maintaining certification standards over time.145
Social and cultural norms also factor into producers’ decision-making
because certification frequently involves changes to production processes.
Potential certification benefits include an increase in profit, increased
market and credit access, increased access to government-based land
rights, and producers’ ability to learn more efficient and environmentally
responsible production processes.146 As more fully detailed below, studies
of the impacts of VSS on producers are just beginning to yield useful data;
early reports indicate that the impacts of VSS on global South producers
are mixed and context-specific.147 This Section summarizes VSS impacts
on producers’ (1) revenue, (2) access to markets and credit, (3) environ-
mental practices, and (4) access to government resources.
143 See Martijn Scheltema, Balancing Public and Private Regulation, 12 UTRECHT L. REV.
16, 30 (2016) (noting that producers bear most of the large risks and costs associated with
VSS uptake and that few VSS account for this fact).
144 See J.W. Molenaar & J.J. Kessler, The Business Benefits of Using Sustainability Stan-
dards: A Meta-Review, AIDENVIRONMENT 4 (2017), https://www.standardsimpacts.org
/sites/default/files/Aidenvironment%20report%20business%20benefits%20of%20sstandards
.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG2M-WAVR].
145 Id. at 24.
146 Id. at 6–7, 28, 35.
147 Greeje Schouten & Verena Bitzer, The Emergence of Southern Standards in Agricul-
tural Value Chains: A New Trend in Sustainability Governance?, 120 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
175, 175 (2015) (observing that the impact of Northern standards on Southern producers
is “highly contested.” Some researchers have found positive socio-economic effects, others
have insignificant or variable effects, and still others have found that the outcome of the
standards are “particularly ambiguous” for small producers. Also noting “[e]ven when
producers are compliant, there is little certainty that the new practices lead to the
desired level of sustainability.”).
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1. Impact of VSS on Producers’ Revenue
Generally, VSS do not have a positive impact on producers’ reve-
nue.148 While certification may increase sales volume through market ac-
cess, the costs of certification tend to keep producers from realizing profits
from VSS.149 A few industries, such as coffee and cocoa, appear to more
consistently yield increased net income for producers because the produc-
ers have more market power.150 They are able to charge a price premium
148 ITC Study, supra note 30. The ITC is a joint venture of the WTO and UN and provides
trade-related technical assistance through the United Nations Conference of Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). Id. at ii. The ITC completed a literature review of fourteen
studies, each of which included a counterfactual control group; the literature review re-
vealed that eight of the fourteen studies found a positive impact; four found mixed or no
evidence of a positive impact, and two found that the standards adversely impacted
producers’ net income. ITC Study, supra, at 14. Study authors conducted a systematic
review of forty-seven research papers that assessed the socioeconomic and environmental
impacts of private VSS on producers in developing countries. Id. at ix. Thirty-five of the
papers were written by academics or researchers commissioned by international organi-
zations; the balance were written by international development organizations or standards
organizations. Id. at 6. Twenty-one of the articles were published in peer-reviewed journals.
Id. at 6. The forty-seven papers discussed a variety of standards, but most focused on
Fairtrade, Organic, and FSC, with most of the control-group studies focused on Fairtrade
and Organic. See Our Role in the UN and WTO, ITC, http://www.intracen.org/itc/about
/how-itc-works/our-role-in-the-un-and-wto/ [https://perma.cc/4F5K-4FEN] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2018). But see Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 30 (discussing the prolifera-
tion of environmental labelling and information schemes, noting that there is “likely no gen-
eral, explicit positive (or negative) impact” of VSS competition that applies to all sectors.
Instead, the impacts vary by industry). The proliferation of VSS among coffee and cocoa pro-
ducers is related to economic and environmental benefits, but in the seafood industry, the
proliferation of VSS has led to a perception that the VSS labels are misleading or un-
verifiable. Id. at 30. Loconto and Dankers note that Fairtrade and Organic were the
“most consistently profitable” for smallholders. Loconto & Dankers, supra note 30, at 45.
149 Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 130. Of the twenty case studies the authors reviewed,
only two certified producers showed a price premium from certification. Id. at 134. The
authors defined developing countries to include those classified as middle or low income
countries by the World Bank in 2014. Id. at 129, n.1. They noted that while over half of
the global forests are located in developing countries, 80 percent of the forests certified by
FSC are in Europe and North America. Id. at 132. Further, as to fisheries, developing
countries supply 60 percent of the volume and 50 percent of the value of fish and fishery
products; only 19 of the 231 MSC certified fisheries are in developing countries. Id. at 132.
150 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 15; COSA, THE COSA MEASURING SUSTAINABILITY REPORT:
COFFEE AND COCOA IN 12 COUNTRIES 3 (2013), https://thecosa.org/wp-content/uploads
/2014/01/The-COSA-Measuring-Sustainability-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y56C-RMPV]
[hereinafter COSA REPORT]. Data from the report was collected from studies conducted
in the following countries between 2009–2013: Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
Colombia, Peru, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Papua New
Guinea. Id. at 36–37. But see Marcela Ibanez & Allen Blackman, Is Eco-Certification a
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for certified goods, and they are able to keep the revenue from the in-
creased prices.151 In other industries, even if the producers can charge a
price premium, supply chain dynamics place market power in the hands
of retailers, who absorb the increase in revenues from price premiums and
do not pass the revenue back to the producers.152 And still other industries,
such as fisheries and forestry, generally will not support a price premium
for certified goods, which means that producers cannot pass the costs of
certification on to buyers and instead, must absorb it themselves.153
2. Impact of VSS on Producers’ Market and Credit Access
Participation in private VSS generally enhances producers’ busi-
ness opportunities, which include access to markets and credit, reputation,
and changes in practices and product variety.154 Enhanced business
Win-Win for Developing Country Agriculture? Organic Coffee Certification in Colombia,
82 WORLD DEV. 14, 15 (2016) (assessing the effect of organic coffee certification in Colombia
and finding that certification provided no benefits to producers’ income or net returns).
The authors examined coffee production in Cauca, Colombia, from 224 certified organic
coffee producers. Id. at 24. They noted that the organic certification scheme they studied
has well-defined standards that are enforced at the farm level through peer and third-
party monitors. Id. at 25. But certification did not produce any benefits to producers in
the form of labor costs, income, or net returns. Id. at 25.
151 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 15; COSA REPORT, supra note 150, at 41. Certified farmers’
yield was 14 percent better than uncertified farmers’ yield; their net income was 7 per-
cent higher; and they had 32 percent more training. COSA REPORT, supra note 150, at
41. Other economic indicators surveyed included revenue, costs, income, diversification
of risk, information related to risk, access to credit, volatility, vulnerability, business
development, differentiation, efficiency, governance, services, and the farmers’ perception
of their economic situation. Id. at 43.
152 Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 132.
153 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 15; Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 132 (stating that
“even if a price premium exists for certified fish, it would not provide a sufficient incen-
tive to sustainably manage fishery stocks”); Loconto & Dankers, supra note 30, at 48
(finding that forest certification rarely resulted in price premiums that covered certi-
fication costs). But see Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 132 (noting that an earlier
study of forestry in the Asia-Pacific region and Bolivia found price premiums as high as
51 percent). Research reveals no other study finding similar price premiums in forestry.
154 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 16. Of the thirteen control group studies that addressed
the issue, nine found positive impacts on business opportunities, four found mixed results
or no impact, and none found negative impacts. Id. at 16. Of those studies with mixed results,
lower crop diversification was most commonly cited. Id. The study authors suggested that
the decrease in crop diversification was a result of the increased success with certified
crops. Id. Because of price premiums and/or increased market access, farmers are more
likely to focus on certified crops, thereby limiting the crops they plant. Id. Forestry study
authors cited mixed results because government regulation drove changes in practice, not
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opportunities and practices may outweigh the importance of price premi-
ums for producers.155 Increases in market and credit access, increased and
better yield quality, and additional training each have long-term impacts
that, while not reflected in immediate profitability, may lead to net long-
term profitability.156 Certification differentiates certified producers’ prod-
ucts from those not certified, giving the products a positive reputation
and prestige.157 Reputational benefits of certification are most pronounced
among small firms.158 To the extent that VSS guide producers toward cul-
tivating relationships with buyers rather than merely making one-off deals,
VSS empowers firms to enter long-term contracts with retailers, which in
turn enables firms to invest in more sustainable practices.159 In the coffee
and cocoa industries, producers tend to seek multiple certifications,
because doing so appears to increase their market options and income.160
Generally, to participate in a certified product market, smallholder
producers must work together, and together, they must participate in
vertically coordinated arrangements.161 Certification requires more orga-
nizational and financial strength than an individual smallholder is capa-
ble of providing.162 Moreover, a vertically coordinated arrangement enables
producers to upgrade their value chain—shifting their participation to
markets for higher-priced goods, resulting in increased revenues.163 Thus,
when considering the impact of VSS on smallholder producers, the impact
is somewhat exclusionary, because it requires smallholders to essentially
migrate away from their smallholder status to be successful. In some
industries, VSS have a direct effect on the way certified smallholders
participate in the market because corporate buyers and supply chain
certification schemes. Id. Non–control group studies revealed the same trends: participa-
tion in private VSS enhances producers’ business opportunities. Id. at 17. Certification
provides producers with international market access. Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23,
at 136. An earlier study showed that certification enabled firms to maintained their client
base or gain access to high value export markets. Id. at 132.
155 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 24.
156 Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 136.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 132.
160 COSA REPORT, supra note 150, at 41.
161 Loconto & Dankers, supra note 30, at 50. See also Jania Grabs et al., Understanding
Coffee Certification Dynamics: A Spatial Analysis of Voluntary Sustainability Standard
Proliferation, 19 INT’L FOOD AND AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 31, 50 (2016) (noting that
smallholder coffee farmers in Latin America “struggle to achieve positive cost-benefit
outcomes of VSS participation”).
162 Grabs et al., supra note 161, at 52.
163 Id.
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captains, not consumers, drive the market and “serve as the gatekeepers
for inclusion in certified value chains.”164 VSS can integrate smallholders
into new markets, but in light of their costs and commitments, VSS must
be seen as a “continuum of improvements towards long-term competitive-
ness rather than an immediate one-time boost to sales.”165
Market access may not be relevant for global South forestry and
fishery producers. About 80 percent of the wood produced in developing
countries is used in developing countries.166 Similarly, the majority of fish
caught in the global South is consumed within the global South.167 Market
access is even less relevant for small-scale fisheries, which tend to pro-
duce more irregular quantities and qualities of fish.168 Such fisheries may
not be integrated into supply chains that require proof of temperature con-
trols, further restricting access.169 Alternatively, market access for large-
scale, industrial fisheries is more prevalent than price premiums because
their size enables them to supply international fish markets and contract
with large corporations, ensuring a stable demand for their fish.170
Although VSS may open new markets for global South producers,
they may also preclude access to markets. As noted above, the WTO’s CTE
provides a forum for member states to discuss trade-related environmental
issues. During the Committee’s 2016 Annual Meeting, Ecuador presented
on its experiences with organic agricultural certification for small- and
medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”), observing that obstacles to SME
uptake of VSS included: VSS administrative costs, lengthy certification
processes, and the need to seek multiple certifications arising from the
lack of harmonization between VSS.171 Ecuador favored a tariff on certi-
fied organic foods to incentivize SMEs to participate in VSS.172 At the 2015
Annual Meeting, delegations urged member countries to consider the in-
terests of developing countries as they responded to reports of illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing.173 During a June 2014 CTE meeting,
the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”), a private,
164 Id. at 39 (referencing PETER GIBBON & STEFANO PONTE, TRADING DOWN: AFRICA, VALUE
CHAINS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Temp. Univ. Press 2005).
165 Locanto & Dankers, supra note 30, at 60.
166 Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 132.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 132, n.5.
170 Id. at 137.
171 CTE, at 2, U.N. Doc. WT/CTE/23 (2016).
172 Id.
173 CTE, at 4, U.N. Doc. WT/CTE/23 (2015).
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non-state actor, presented on its requirements and guidelines for the
greenhouse gas footprint of products and its draft standard addressing
the water footprint of products, processes and organizations.174 While some
delegations at the meeting expressed support for the ISO work, others
expressed concern regarding the impact of the standards on developing
country SMEs market access, cautioning that the standards could be
used as a trade barrier.175 In response to the OECD report on its ecolabel
project, delegations expressed concern about the impact of the prolifera-
tion of VSS on market access for developing country producers.176
3. VSS Impact on Producers’ Environmental Practices
VSS typically require producers to educate themselves on efficient
and environmentally responsible production processes. Benefits of VSS
participation include increased awareness of environmental impacts and
enhanced stakeholder participation.177 For example, the certification pro-
cess enabled producers to better understand the need to protect their
stock to ensure that it would be available for long-term business.178 Certifi-
cation exposed producers to training in safety, hygiene, nutrition, dispute
resolution, leadership, efficient management practices, and of course, the
certificate’s rules and regulations.179 Producers’ pride and self-esteem
that flows from producing a certified product is a significant benefit of
certification, one that “may in some cases be sufficient to drive continued
sustainable resource management development.”180
4. VSS Impacts on Producers’ Access to Government Resources
To thrive in a certified market, certified smallholders need insti-
tutional support from national governments in the form of national regu-
lations, subsidies, or preferential trade arrangements.181 Certification has
provided producers with government support and empowerment, including
“regulatory relief, tax benefits, public good provision, and preferential
174 CTE, at 1, U.N. Doc. WT/CTE/21 (2014).
175 Id. at 1–2.
176 Id. at 4.
177 Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 135.
178 Id. at 136
179 Id. at 135.
180 Id. at 136.
181 Loconto & Dankers, supra note 30, at 40.
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treatment in the allocation of resource access rights.”182 Increase in access
rights was the most prominent benefit certified producers received from
governments. Access rights included “securing land- or fishery-use conces-
sions, allocation of catch quotas, or legal recognition of customary rights.”183
Securing such rights is essential if a producer is to invest in the infra-
structure and equipment necessary for certification, and ultimately engage
in more environmentally sustainable practices.184 As a result of acquiring
access rights, certified producers were empowered to engage in long-term
planning, which benefitted the producers and the environment.185
In terms of public-private initiatives, while early studies indicated
that government did not and should not play a role in certification, con-
temporary studies indicate that government can and does facilitate
smallholder producers’ access to certified markets.186 Specifically, govern-
ments can facilitate the investment in certification by: providing support
services, such as testing labs and extension offices to provide training
about certification; establishing national standards that harmonize with
international standards; and finally, governments themselves can incen-
tivize smallholder participation by establishing procurement plans that
purchase certified products.187
This Section has focused on the impacts that VSS have on global
South producers. Though the research pool is shallow, a few general
conclusions can be drawn. As currently structured, producers see little
profit from participating in VSS; some producers have found that VSS
create new market and credit opportunities, while others have found VSS
create barriers to market entry. VSS have helped some producers learn
more efficient and environmentally responsible production processes.
And finally, government can play an important role in facilitating pro-
ducer uptake of VSS.
B. Integration of Global South Producers into VSS Governance
One might expect that producers would play a fundamental role
in the governance structure of VSS, given how integral producers are to
the success of VSS. As further discussed below, however, such is not the
case. In fact, the general trend is for producers to play a limited or no role
182 Carlson & Palmer, supra note 23, at 135.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 135–36.
185 Id. at 136.
186 Loconto & Dankers, supra note 30, at 60–61.
187 Id.
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at all in VSS governance structure.188 In a survey of thirty-three VSS,
research revealed that twenty VSS (61 percent) do not reserve producers
a seat on their important decision-making bodies.189 Among the twenty,
eight imply producers will be represented, but do not require participa-
tion, and twelve offer no representation opportunities to producers.190 A
separate study of forty-five VSS found that only 14 percent reported that
they include populations affected by the standards, such as producers
and local communities, in their decision-making.191 Researchers found
that 98 percent of VSS included industry and civil society representatives
in their decision-making,192 but that representation is not equal, reveal-
ing significant power imbalances in decision-making bodies.193 Two
entities, PEFC and Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, report that in-
dustry stakeholders outnumber other stakeholders by 4:1.194 VSS may
permit NGOs to serve in governance, and some NGOs represent produc-
ers’ interests,195 but unless the NGO’s organization documents compel it
to do so, the NGO may act in its own best interests, thus making NGOs a
poor substitute for producers in VSS governance. Some VSS draw producers
into standard-setting committees, but not high decision-making bodies.196
While producers should be involved in standard setting, they should not
188 Elizabeth A. Bennett, Who Governs Socially-Oriented Voluntary Sustainability Stan-
dards? Not the Producers of Certified Products, 91 WORLD DEV., 53, 60–61 (2016); see BEN
COLLINS ET AL., THE NEW REGULATORS? ASSESSING THE LANDSCAPE OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER
INITIATIVES 9 (2017), https://msi-database.org/data/The%20New%20Regulators%20-%20
MSI%20Database%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UVA-AGJW].
189 Bennett, supra note 188, at 61. The author selected a set of VSS from those frequently
studied in academic literature and those on the ISEAL membership list. Id. at 58. From
that set, she identified ten criteria, including those VSS that were private standard
setters, certified supply chains, used third party auditors, and those that certified entities
with production sites in at last two regions/continents and had products that were
produced and consumed in different countries. Id. at 58.
190 Id. at 61–62. The author discusses how decision making bodies include boards of
directors, general assemblies, and advisory councils. Id. at 57. Bennett’s research focused
on the two decision-making bodies with the most power in the organization.
191 COLLINS ET AL., supra note 188, at 5. The report defines MSI as entities that (1) have
a governance structure that requires more than one stakeholder in its primary decision
making body, (2) set standards, which (3) operate in more than one country, and (4) focus
on standardizing conduct on issues of public concern, such as human rights, the envi-
ronment, and corruption prevention. Id. at 6. The authors noted that research collected
data on MSIs from the MSIs’ websites. Id. at 6.
192 Id. at 5.
193 Id. at 11.
194 Id.
195 Bennett, supra note 188, at 62.
196 Id. at 65.
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be precluded from participating in the VSS’s most significant decisions,
such as which producers the VSS will target, how many producers the
VSS can carry, and VSS benefits to producers and growth strategies.197
Researchers acknowledge that while 49 percent of the VSS engaged af-
fected populations outside of decision-making through implementation
workshops or interviews during compliance reviews, such consultation
is insufficient; those directly affected by VSS ought to have a say in the
structure of VSS.198
That producers typically play such a small role in VSS governance
is troubling. Producers, such as Suresh and Diego, have a wealth of infor-
mation about how to produce their products in a sustainable manner and
the economics of sustainable production.199 Moreover, because producer
participation in VSS is voluntary and the profit potential for producers
is questionable, if producers are not included in the VSS governance
structure, they are less likely to participate in the VSS. To the extent
that the proliferation of VSS has led to a certification landscape that
essentially requires certification for market access, such as in the Indian
coffee markets, when producers are not included in VSS decision-making,
the producers lose a right to self-determination, and the VSS themselves
become less inclusive and less democratic.200 Alternatively, when primary
decision-making bodies are included in VSS—such that producers have
a meaningful voice in how the VSS are organized, the standards are set,
and the certified entities are audited and possibly sanctioned—producers
have a vested interest in VSS outcomes, and as a result, are more likely
to meaningfully participate in the VSS. In addition, participation in gov-
ernance may build producer communication, management, and leadership
skills, which may be transferable to producers’ organizations and lead to
stronger environmental impacts.
An organization’s failure to include a key stakeholder in gover-
nance is not a random decision, but reflects the organization’s strategy
for survival and effectiveness.201 In the VSS context, survival is linked to
the VSS’s legitimacy, and for some VSS, that legitimacy is expressed by
the VSS’s inclusive approach to governance.202 But clearly, VSS can derive
a sufficient degree of legitimacy to survive without including producers,
197 Id.
198 COLLINS ET AL., supra note 188, at 10.
199 See Bennett, supra note 188, at 61; COLLINS ET AL., supra note 188, at 9.
200 Bennett, supra note 188, at 55.
201 Id. at 55–56.
202 Id.
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as this is demonstrated by those in the study that have survived for decades
without including producers in governance.203 An organization’s gover-
nance structure may reflect those to whom the organization is primarily
accountable, such as donors, members of industry, and civil society.204 If
the organization does not perceive itself to be primarily accountable to
producers, it may have little interest to include producers in gover-
nance.205 Alternatively, organizations may design governance structures
to facilitate access to the resources that the organizations need to be ef-
fective, which include funding, information, and major contracts.206 Thus,
the organization may include in governance those stakeholders that provide
access to important resources and exclude those, such as producers,
which do not.207
A related empirical study of VSS considered (1) the extent to which
VSS support producers and (2) the geographic availability of VSS.208 The
study found that VSS tend to provide more support for producers when
the VSS are: full members of ISEAL, headquartered in an OECD country,
have been in existence for longer than average, and engage producers and
buyers in management of the VSS.209 VSS variables that reflect no predic-
tive relationship to producer support include whether the VSS was public
(connected to a formal government scheme) or for-profit and private. Not
surprisingly, VSS availability is significantly and positively correlated
203 Id. at 65.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Bennett, supra note 188, at 65.
207 Id.
208 See Access to VSS, supra note 125.
209 Id. at 16–17. The authors conducted an empirical study of approximately 1000 data
points on 180 VSS arising from eighty sectors. Id. at 6. All of the VSS studied covered at
least one sustainability area (economic and management, ethics and integrity, environment,
quality management system, or social), had a fixed governance structure, and credible
audit system. Id. The information was assimilated into a database, called the Sustainability
Map. Sustainability Map: Your Roadmap to Sustainable Consumption, Production and
Trade, ITC, http://sustainabilitymap.org/home [https://perma.cc/R25U-QQSC] (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2018). The authors defined support for producers as: Technical Assistance
for Requirements, Technical Assistance Beyond Requirements, Financial Assistance, and
Learning Forums. Access to VSS, supra note 125, at 15. OECD Countries include:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States. See Members and partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpart
ners/ [https://perma.cc/5D7V-EA79] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
116 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:83
to country level GDP.210 The more wealthy a country, the more likely the
country’s markets include high-quality goods touting sustainability bene-
fits.211 The demand for such goods incentivizes profit-maximizing certifiers
and VSS to enter the markets and certify the goods.212 Markets where
firms are more competitive will have more VSS available to them.213 The
study defined firm competition in terms of the firm’s ability to effectively
and efficiently manage its resources as expressed through its use of in-
dicators to gauge best practices.214 The indicators included use of a bank
account, email, and the capacity to engage in high volume production.215
C. Impacts of VSS on the Global South Environment
Though the topic is not well-researched,216 VSS appear to have
little positive impact on the environment in the global South. The dearth
of research perhaps reflects the difficulty of tracking environmental out-
comes and the difficulties associated with control group-based research
projects. To the extent it occurs, the environmental impact of private VSS
is a product of the VSS’s market share, the rigor of its standards, and the
appropriateness of the standards, given the countries where it operates.217
As with the impact on global South producers noted above, the impact of
VSS on the environment in the global South is mixed.218 Studies reflect
210 Access to VSS, supra note 125, at 21.
211 Id. at 20.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 22.
214 Id. at 21.
215 Id.
216 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 21 (noting that environmental impact was the least
studied effect of producers’ participation in VSS). The ITC study found five control-group
studies examined in the issue, of those, three found positive impact, one found no impact,
and one found adverse impact. Id. at 22. Positive impacts included increased soil conser-
vation and enhanced resource management. Id. The mixed-impact study assessed forestry
certification in Bolivia and found that certification provided little environmental improve-
ment and that deforestation was unabated. Id. Negative impacts included soil erosion on
Fairtrade farms. Id. Non-control group studies were also sparse and revealed the same
thin results. Id. at 25. Other literature reviews reached similar conclusions. See Prag,
Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 22 (citing a 2011 literature review that found none of
the eleven peer-reviewed studies it examined displayed any statistically significant evidence
that certification improved producers’ environmental performance). Non-peer-reviewed
studies found certification led to positive environmental impacts, but Prag noted that
drawing conclusions with confidence from such studies is difficult. Id.
217 Prag, Lyon & Russillo, supra note 81, at 22.
218 BARTLEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 102–04.
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a range of results: from producers’ adoption of more favorable environ-
mental practices, to increases in adverse environmental outcomes, such
as deforestation, as a result of certification.219
Certification of coffee farms has resulted in positive environmental
outcomes, such as soil220 and water conservation,221 a decrease in the use
of raw sewage as fertilizer and increase in organic and pulp fertilizers,222
and an increase in biodiversity.223
Certification in the forestry industry, however, appears to do more
harm than good. Studies show a few favorable outcomes, but generally,
certification does not abate deforestation224 and has been shown to lower
tree regeneration.225 Some researchers assessed the environmental impact
219 COSA REPORT, supra note 150, at 40–41; Ibanez & Blackman, supra note 150, at 24;
BARTLEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 102–03 (stating that in the forestry industry, while
some harvesters of high-value tropical hardwoods have realized a premium for certified
wood, “[f]or most forest management companies, market premiums have been uncertain
or so small that they barely cover the direct costs of certification”; also noting in Bolivia,
increases in certification did not slow the rate of deforestation).
220 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 22.
221 COSA REPORT, supra note 150, at 40–41. The report discussed how water and soil
conservation practices included whether soil cover was mulch or planted soil; whether the
farmers used check dams, drainage channels, or diversion ditches to retain water, and
whether the farmers used soil ridges around the plants, contour planting and terracing,
and trees and shrubs as fencing. Id. at 61.
222 Ibanez & Blackman, supra note 150, at 24.
223 COSA REPORT, supra note 150, at 40–41. COSA found that producers who are certified
with VSS engage in 33 percent more environmentally responsible water and soil practices
and their farming is correlated with a 17 percent increase in the level of biodiversity. Id.
at 40–41. COSA measured biodiversity by surveying the extent to which the producers’
land was grassland, monoculture, and produced with sparse shade, dense shade or covered
with natural forest. Id. at 63.
224 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 22 (a mixed impact study assessed forestry certification
in Bolivia and found that certification provided little environmental improvement and
that deforestation was unabated); ALLEN BLACKMAN ET AL., DOES ECO-CERTIFICATION
STEM TROPICAL DEFORESTATION?, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL CERTIFICATION IN MEXICO
(2015), http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-DP-15-36.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XYK
-P4LT] (finding “no evidence that FSC certification affects deforestation”). In addressing
their findings, the authors noted that their study tested only deforestation, not other
environmental impacts such as forest degradation. Id. at 31–32. They further noted that
their findings were consistent with five of six other quantitative studies of certification’s
impact on the environment. Id. at 31.
225 ALLEN BLACKMAN ET AL., DOES FOREST CERTIFICATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAVE
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS? INSIGHTS FROM MEXICAN CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUESTS 3
(2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14-06.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G2VU-4DNN]. In their review of literature addressing the effectiveness of
forestry certification, the authors observed that there has not been much research done
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of VSS by analyzing the number and scope of corrective action requests
(“CARs”) that certified producers received as a way of assessing the extent
to which the producers modified their forestry practices.226 These results
were also mixed.227 A study of CARs in Brazil and Mexico found that most
were easily corrected (signaling little environmental benefit) and despite
an increase in certification, deforestation and degradation persisted.228
This Section has summarized empirical research into the impact
of VSS on producers in the global South and the global South environ-
ment. While the research is nascent, some early themes have emerged:
VSS appear to only have a slight positive impact on producers’ net income,
have generally increased producers’ market access, and VSS participa-
tion has taught producers more efficient and environmentally responsible
production practices. Those practices have led to some environmental
benefits, including more responsible use of chemicals and water and
increases in biodiversity on coffee farms. But certification of forests has
not generally had a positive environmental impact. Of course additional
in the area and the findings that exist are mixed. Id. at 2. The authors noted that most
studies that sought to quantitatively evaluate certification based on direct observation
do not weed out those producers that sustainably manage their forests prior to certifica-
tion, such that certification comes easily and without enhanced benefit to the environment.
Id. at 2–3. The authors found only two studies that set aside producers with self-selection
bias; in one, certification resulted in “minor effects on a range of environmental outcomes,”
but in the other tree regeneration “was actually lower on certified plots than on conventional
ones.” Id. at 3.
226 Id. at 4.
227 Id.
228 Id. In their study, the authors focused on Mexico where the FSC has certified thirty-
nine producers, the third highest number of any developing country. Id. at 6. FSC’s
certification program extends beyond direct forestry management and also evaluates
social issues such as communication, conflict resolution, worker training, and safety. Id.
at 6–8. In conducting their study, the authors set aside producers with self-selection bias
and reviewed 1162 CARs issued from 1997 to 2013. Id. at 14. They found that 44 percent
of the CARs focused on social issues, with most of them directed at communication and
conflict resolution. Id. at 15. The authors also noted that 26 percent of the CARs con-
cerned forest management, specifically focusing on regeneration and reforestation, while
16 percent concerned environmental issues, focusing on sensitive sites and high conservation
value forests. Id. at 15–16. In discussing their findings, the authors opined that FSC may
have focused on well-performing producers and that FSC certification has not “lifted
relatively poor performing [producers] out of the cellar.” Id. at 21. The authors further
noted that social-issue CARs may have predominated because Mexico’s forestry management
involves common property and “complex social and regulatory structures,” resulting in
the need for enhanced communication and conflict resolution. Id. The authors concluded
that developing country “[s]ocial institutions need to be built and enhanced to ensure
sustainable forest management.” Id. at 22.
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empirical research is essential, especially control group-based research
into the impact of VSS on the environment, but collectively, the findings
described here suggest that absent changes to their regulatory structure,
VSS are not an effective or efficient means for accomplishing environ-
mental goals. After describing a few successful VSS originating in the
global South, the next Part recommends changes to VSS governance
structure that may enable VSS to be a more effective environmental gov-
ernance tool.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF GLOBAL SOUTH-BASED VSS AND THE
PATH AHEAD
The previous Parts have described the impact of VSS that have
been developed in the global North, directed at the global South, but
have not generally included producers into their governance, and have
not drawn public government into their structure. Granted, the limited
effectiveness of VSS in meeting environmental goals suggests that they
cannot be the global South’s only environmental regulatory tool. But we
have not yet seen what VSS might accomplish if they were developed in
the global South, inclusive in their governance structure, and imbued
with Relational Integrity Regulation principles. After describing a few
global South-based VSS, the next Section of the Article casts a vision for
such a VSS.
A few global South-based VSS have emerged in recent years,
which is perhaps not surprising, given the proliferation of schemes in the
global North and the potential for the schemes to produce benefits in the
global South. To avoid repeating the mistakes that VSS in the global
North have made and to ensure that global South VSS reach their
potential, the Article recommends that the global South VSS abide by
Relational Integrity Regulation principles: that is, they should be reflex-
ive, preference-directed, activate consumers’ personal norms, and focus
on product and production process attributes. In addition, to the extent
possible, the global South VSS should harmonize with other VSS and
include collective assessment provisions. Having taken these steps,
global South VSS need not be concerned with running afoul of WTO’s
intergovernmental trade agreements because enforcement of the agree-
ments’ provisions against global South VSS is unlikely. And the steps are
feasible, if the global South draws upon the expertise and resources
available to it.
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A. Global South-Based VSS Originating and Operating in the
Global South
A few global South-based VSS have been established in recent
years, and work is being done to build more.229 Drawing from the exam-
ple of Indonesia’s work with sustainable palm oil, a researcher identified
several factors that have contributed to the emergence of global South
VSS: (1) global South governments recognize that sustainability is of
national interest and effective stewardship of the environment is a source
of national pride; (2) Southern countries have recognized that North-based
certification schemes are an expression of “an unbalanced power rela-
tionship between consumer countries and producer countries,” and the
North-based schemes have impeded Southern producers’ market access
and incorrectly dismissed Southern producers’ products as unsustainable;
and (3) North-based private non-state actor certification schemes have
essentially functioned as a trade barrier, whereas South-based schemes
are perceived as a trade opportunity.230
Global South governments that move toward their own VSS gener-
ally proceed through three phases.231 First, many varied North-based
VSS confront firms within a Southern nation, but the Southern nation’s
government regards the VSS as an issue that Southern firms must
contend with on their own.232 In the second phase, the Southern govern-
ment realizes that VSS may be essential for success in the global market,
so it begins cooperating with private Northern VSS.233 Having experienced
the factors listed above, in the third phase, the Southern government
develops its own environmental certification scheme.234
In a study examining the emergence of three global South VSS—
palm oil in Indonesia, soy in Brazil, and fruit in South Africa—scholars
found two significant differences between the North-based VSS operating
in each country and the Southern schemes that emerged: the schemes tar-
geted different audiences and they had different sources of legitimacy.235
229 See PIETER GLASBERGEN, ARE SOUTHERN GOVERNMENTS RECLAIMING SUSTAINABILITY
STANDARD-SETTING, in MEETING SUSTAINABILITY GOALS: VOLUNTARY SUSTAINABILITY STAN-
DARDS AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 33 (2016), https://unfss.files.wordpress.com/2016
/09/final_unfss-report28092016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GP8-S3ES].
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Greetje Schouten & Verena Bitzer, The emergence of Southern standards in agricultural
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As to audiences, the authors of the study found that the Northern
standards targeted external groups, such as NGOs and multinational
buyers when developing standards.236 As a result, the standards reflect
North-based value chain thinking, and the standards direct a North-based,
demand-side sustainability agenda toward the South.237 Alternatively, the
Southern standards initially sought an internal audience of supply side
producers within the Southern nations.238 The emphasis was on state sov-
ereignty to design and implement sustainable agricultural regulation.239
As to sources of legitimacy, Northern standards are strongly rooted
in moral sources of legitimacy that include Northern constructions of sus-
tainability.240 Northern-based standards that are directed to the South
have filled perceived voids in Southern environmental governance.241 How-
ever, as indicated from the emergence of Southern standards, the South
is beginning to reject the idea that it cannot engage in its own effective
environmental governance, and thus, it need not seek to conform to the
North’s definition of sustainability to participate in the marketplace for
its goods.242 Southern nations are developing a sense of national pride
and nation-specific brand identity to reposition producer firms in the global
value chain.243 The authors characterize such legitimacy as “cognitive
legitimacy” and assert that as a source of legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy
is much more durable than the moral legitimacy that roots the Northern
standards.244 The authors additionally noted that the Southern standards
also find legitimacy in being more cost-productive for producers by pro-
viding less stringent and less expensive requirements, which enables more
widespread adoption of the standards.245
Scholars caution that challenges arising from the current struc-
ture of the global South VSS may impede the performance of the VSS.246
The challenges include (1) enforcement, especially with many smallholders
value chains: A new trend in sustainability governance?, 120 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 175, 181
(2015).
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Schouten & Bitzer, supra note 235, at 181.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 182.
245 Id. at 181.
246 See GLASBERGEN, supra note 229, at 33; Schouten & Bitzer, supra note 235, at 182.
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contributing to the market;247 (2) uptake, because the standards may not
provide a direct means for producers to enhance their market share and
the standards do not provide support for costly audit procedures;248 (3) in-
tegrity, because the Southern standards tout their regional, Southern focus,
yet the standards merely imitate the content of Northern standards, but on
a state-specific scale;249 and (4) scope—the Southern standards empha-
size national identity, pride, and sovereignty, but if the VSS certify goods
to be exported to the North, they need to be internationally recognized.250
Given these current challenges, the standards may not have solved any
of the producer-level problems that the Northern standards created.251
B. Next Steps in the Development of Global South VSS
In light of the four challenges noted above, the path forward in-
volves the following steps: (1) build VSS that integrate public and private
stakeholders into environmental governance by conforming the VSS to
Relational Integrity Regulation; (2) to the extent possible, harmonize VSS
within industry sectors and with international standards, especially if
the certified products will supply international markets; and (3) establish
a culture of assessment that will produce the data necessary to discern
whether the VSS are performing as they should and how they can be
better utilized.
1. Global South VSS Should Conform to Sound Environmental
Governance Principles
Seeking a form of meta-regulation, there is widespread support for
the integration of public and private stakeholders into environmental gov-
ernance.252 Currently in some global South countries, private VSS fill in
247 See GLASBERGEN, supra note 229, at 33–34.
248 See Schouten & Bitzer, supra note 235, at 182.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 ITC Study, supra note 30, at 24; Schouten & Bitzer, supra note 235, at 181; GLASBERGEN,
supra note 229, at 7–12 (discussing drivers for government involvement with VSS and
roles government can play); id. at 27–28 (stating that “governments can have an im-
portant role to play as a developer of national-level standards for use in domestic markets,
as a convener of local stakeholders and sectoral roundtables or dialogues, and as a source
of support for smallholder training and other initiatives,” and that “governments should
be the proponent of policies and regulations, land use planning and zoning programs,
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gaps left by public regulation; in others, the systems are superfluous,
with VSS not changing the practices of those producers that comply with
existing government regulation.253 Integrating private and public regula-
tion may enhance producer benefits and ultimately enhance environmen-
tal benefits.254
Such integration should conform to Relational Integrity Regulation
principles, which by their nature draw public and private stakeholders
into the regulatory process.255 As noted above, this species of regulation
improved governance and enforcement, resolution of land use conflict and disputes, or
other policy frameworks that can improve the enabling environment and thereby mutually
support the transformative change envisioned by VSS”); id. at 31 (stating “government
cooperation in the creation and implementation of VSS, though rendering more trans-
action costs, lends more legitimacy and credibility to the standard itself ” and “VSS that
are aligned with national and global development goals will have the biggest impact on
progress because they span the chasm between public and private spheres”); id. at 47–48
(highlighting the global South VSS in Brazil and Mozambique and suggesting that gov-
ernment can work with VSS to establish a “jurisdictional approach” to VSS, where the
certification moves beyond individual producers to include entire regions); OECD, GREEN
GROWTH AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS, 11–12 (2012),
https://www.oecd.org/dac/50526354.pdf [https://perma.cc/94HH-BUQT] (advocating for
developing countries to establish nationwide green growth policies that integrate public
and private interests). See also Peter Eddie Aldinger, Addressing Environmental Justice
Concerns in Developing Countries: Mining in Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana, 26 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 378–85 (2014) (recommending that developing countries increase the
level of public participation in environmental governance to ensure that the governance
properly treats environmental justice issues); OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 15. In
partnership with UNFSS, India and Brazil have recently launched national VSS plat-
forms. See MANISH PANDE, THE INDIA STORY: IMPACT OF PRIVATE SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS
ON MARKET ACCESS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (2017); Launch of the Brazilian Voluntary Sustainability
Standards National Platform Support, UNFSS (May 31, 2017), https://unfss.org/2017
/05/18/launch-of-the-brazilian-voluntary-sustainability-standards-national-platform-sup
ported-by-unfss/ [https://perma.cc/5H72-EN9W]; Creating an Ecosystem for Quality, QUALITY
COUNCIL OF INDIA, http://www.qcin.org/Indian-PSS-Platform.php [https://perma.cc/UHY5
-5FZY] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (showing that India has launched a national VSS plat-
form, through its national government–initiated Quality Council. The Council will work
with representatives from government agencies, industry (including manufacturing and
service) and consumers to generate a domestic VSS). For an introduction to the VSS
platform in India, see Manish Pande, A Platform for PSS in India, QUALITY COUNCIL OF
INDIA (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.qcin.org/documents/00_introduction%20to %20the%20
platform_16122016_Manish.pdf [https://perma.cc/G52X-S2KJ]. See also Marx & Wouters,
supra note 94, at 19–20.
253 Marx & Wouters, supra note 94, at 19.
254 Id.
255 Minneti, supra note 30, at 1377 (noting that the ISO’s environmental marketing claim
standards meet or exceed relational integrity criteria, and perhaps exceed state-actor
standards).
124 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:83
involves four attributes: it is reflexive; it is preference directed; it is aimed
at activating consumers’ personal norms; and it focuses on the product
and its production process.256
Reflexive environmental regulation empowers relevant stakeholders
to determine the best course of environmental management for them-
selves.257 For example, should India choose to develop a coffee-based VSS,
it would enact a regulation that prescribes who should play a role in VSS
decision-making and script fundamental processes for setting standards,
certifying and auditing producers, enforcing the standards, and address-
ing disputes arising from the VSS implementation. Private stakeholders,
including Suresh and other area producers, members of the products’
value chain, such as roasters and distributors, NGOs, and consumer rep-
resentatives would give substance to the VSS by determining the nature
and scope of the standards and the precise steps in the processes associated
with VSS implementation. Reflexive regulation leverages stakeholders’
strengths, such as Suresh’s understanding of the local economy and his
relationships with those in the coffee industry and environmental NGOs,
which can provide Suresh and other producers with environmental best
practices for coffee growing and harvesting.
Government, which has expertise in establishing regulatory frame-
works, access to public resources, capacities for information campaigns,
and vested interests in the sustainable use of natural resources, is called
upon to share those strengths with private VSS stakeholders. In Argentina,
for example, VSS would provide a vehicle regulating the environmental
practices of smallholder producers such as Diego. Rather than regulate
through command and control regulation that is expensive and difficult
to enforce, Argentina can set in motion a VSS, which carries its own in-
centives for enforcement. Argentina can incentivize smallholder partici-
pation by providing the fisheries with access to otherwise restricted waters
and promote the VSS through information campaigns, targeting local pro-
ducers and consumers. Private stakeholders, such as Diego, who are most
familiar with market forces and industry needs and have a vested interest
in the success of the certified products, bring their expertise and interest
to bear in creating the nature, scope, and precise detail of the standards,
certifying and auditing producers, and promoting certified products.
When VSS are produced through reflexive regulation in the global
South, the scheme has increased integrity because the VSS reflect the
global South’s perspective on sustainable development. Nations in the
256 Id. at 1343.
257 Id. at 1337.
2018] ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 125
global South perceive that North-based standards tend to serve Northern
interests.258 Northern actors’ understandings of sustainability, scientific
knowledge, and big firm interests tend to drive the content of standards.259
And Southern participation in the development of standards content is
“quantitatively and qualitatively” less significant than Northern partici-
pation.260 Thus, there is “unbalanced distribution of costs and benefits to
the detriment of Southern producers,” and a “disempowerment of South-
ern stakeholders due to their exclusion from decision making processes.”261
Alternatively, global South-based schemes advance the global South’s
environmental and economic values and priorities, and the global South’s
construct of property rights. A reflexive South-based VSS would give a
regulatory voice to those typically left out of the decision-making, such
as Suresh and Diego, in North-based schemes.262 As such, the schemes
would directly address the enforcement, uptake, integrity, and scope chal-
lenges noted above that have plagued existing global South-based VSS
that lack a reflexive structure.
Relational Integrity Regulation is also preference-directed.263
Preference-directed regulation provides information to consumers so that
they can make choices consistent with their preferences.264 VSS are
preference-directed because they bear product labels that inform consumers
about products’ environmental attributes, enabling consumers to make
purchase decisions consistent with their environmental preferences. When
the VSS are accompanied by an information campaign, the VSS can
educate consumers about environmental issues associated with products
and production processes, thereby shaping their preferences. A global
258 Schouten & Bitzer, supra note 235, at 175.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 181.
262 Emmanuelle Cheyns, Making “minority voices” heard in transnational roundtables: the
role of local NGOs in reintroducing justice and attachments, 31 AGRIC. HUMAN VALUES
49, 449–51 (2014) (describing approaches to communication that NGOs can utilize with pro-
ducers to ensure that producers are more engaged in VSS, including: (1) teaching pro-
ducers how other VSS stakeholders communicate with each other and how producers can
effectively communicate with those stakeholders; and (2) helping producers establish a
common cause between themselves and other stakeholders). For a discussion of the pathways
to VSS certification for coffee producers in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, see Grabs
et al., supra note 161, at 49 (stating that the current VSS “incentive structure rewards either
large, advanced, already sustainable farms due to their reliability and the low implementa-
tion costs of farms located in select geographic areas well known for particular flavors”).
263 Minneti, supra note 30, at 1343.
264 Id. at 1338–39.
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South-based VSS would likely communicate more directly with global
South consumers and businesses than a VSS originating in the global
North because the VSS messages would be cast in a language more famil-
iar to those in the global South and more consistent with their prefer-
ences. In the coffee context, for example, coffee that is shade-grown in
India is not only better for the coffee, but it is better for the environment
because it preserves and protects biodiversity and wildlife, and by per-
mitting the natural canopy of trees to stand on the hillside, the practice
protects against erosion and runoff during the monsoon seasons.265 A
coffee-based VSS would direct consumers’ preferences by guiding them
to shade-grown (thus environmentally responsible) coffee. Likewise, a
VSS attached to Patagonian cod would emphasize that the fish are sus-
tainably caught, emphasizing that the approach to fishing will protect
the stock for future generations.
Relational Integrity Regulation activates an individual’s personal
norms.266 Personal norms are those that draw upon an individual’s
personal sense of duty or obligation to act.267 Regulation can activate and
deepen personal norms by creating an awareness of the significance of
consumers’ individual and collective choices regarding environmentally
responsible behavior.268 Through on-product or off-product information
campaigns, VSS can activate consumers’ personal norms by informing
consumers of the significance of their individual purchases (such as the
extent to which a good has less post-consumer waste) and the signifi-
cance of collective purchases (such as how less waste is generated when
consumers as a group purchase the products that conform to the VSS).
Given the inherently personal nature of this aspect of Relational Integrity
Regulation, a global South-based VSS would more effectively activate con-
sumers’ personal norms than a global North-based scheme because the
global South scheme would be a product of those closest to the global South
consumers. In Argentina, where most of the Patagonian cod is locally
caught and consumed, a VSS developed in Argentina would be able to com-
municate more directly with the Argentine population, because it would
be a product of the people in Argentina. The logo and information about
the VSS would be a natural expression of Argentine values and thus more
likely to activate consumers’ personal norms.
265 See S. Gopikrishna Warrier, Bringing Coffee Back Into The Shade, INDIA CLIMATE DIA-
LOGUE (Sept. 12, 2016), http://indiaclimatedialogue.net/2016/09/12/putting-shade-back
-growing-coffee-sun/ [https://perma.cc/U9MW-JQ3C].
266 Minneti, supra note 30, at 1340–41.
267 Id.
268 Id.
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In the VSS context, Relational Integrity Regulation focuses on both
the product’s environmental attributes and the product’s production pro-
cess’s environmental attributes.269 Producing a recyclable product is good,
but producing a recyclable product with a production process that is more
environmentally responsible than other processes is better. Effective
production process management requires effective value chain manage-
ment from producer to end user. VSS originating in the global South
would be able to take better advantage of global South-based value chains
because the VSS stakeholders could leverage existing business and manu-
facturing relationships in setting environmentally responsible standards
for production processes, essentially growing the product and production
process standards from within. VSS originating in the global North enter
global South value chains from a distance, and must be imposed upon the
global South marketplace, somewhat artificially, and must construct value
chain relationships anew, requiring the investment of resources to culti-
vate trust between market players. As in much of the global South,
smallholder producers such as Suresh and Diego generate goods, which
in the aggregate, have a significant environmental impact. Generating a
VSS that focuses on the products’ life cycles will require an intimate
understanding of local market forces and environmental conditions. When
the VSS is a product of the global South, it stands a better chance of being
responsive to those forces and conditions.
2. Global South VSS Should Harmonize with Other VSS
In addition to conforming to Relational Integrity Regulation prin-
ciples, to the extent feasible, global South VSS should harmonize with
one another. As described in detail above, in many industries, such as
coffee, VSS have proliferated through horizontal intensification. From a
producer’s perspective, that has meant producers, such as Suresh, must
often seek certification from several VSS, resulting in expensive applica-
tion and auditing processes.270 From a consumer’s perspective, the prolif-
eration has led to confusion about the significance of the VSS and a dilution
in the value of VSS. Harmonization arises when VSS agree to recognize
one another, such that a producer’s certification by one VSS is recognized
by another. To the extent that a producer participates in a value chain,
269 Id. at 1341–42.
270 See ITC, THE INTERPLAY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STANDARDS, LITERATURE REVIEW
SERIES ON THE IMPACTS OF PRIVATE STANDARDS—PART III 32–33 (2011).
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downstream members of the chain would accept the producer’s product
as long as the product was certified by the VSS associated with the value
chain or one recognized as certified. As a result, harmonization removes
producers’ need for multiple certifications to participate in certified mar-
kets. In the coffee industry, for example, the Kodagu region, which is
known for the quality of its coffee, could generate a standard that, while
an expression of the Kodagu people, is consistent with other VSS in India.
Distributors and retailers would recognize the Kodagu VSS as well as
other regional or national VSS that conform to the same baseline stan-
dards, thus negating the need for producers to certify to the VSS for each
retailer or distributor to which they seek to sell.
Because VSS operating in the same industry sectors compete with
one another for certifications, the VSS entities themselves are not likely
to seek harmonization. In fact, as noted above, as VSS compete for certi-
fications, they will find that as they lower their standards, they increase
their certifications, resulting in a race to the lowest possible standards and
decreased environmental impact. To combat such a trend, public or private
meta-regulators should incentivize harmonization. For example, in India,
VSS industry leaders or India itself may require that overlapping stan-
dards recognize each other, or that, prior to entering the standard-setting
field, a VSS must complete a market analysis, ensuring that there is a
genuine need for the VSS because there are no other VSS certifying the
same products to similar levels.271 Such meta-regulation would likely limit
the number of VSS for a commodity, thereby reducing the potential for
consumer confusion about VSS and the potential for competing VSS to
dilute environmental standards.
Harmonization should occur among private and public standards,
and, to the extent possible, between private and public standards.272 Again,
271 Id. at 34–35 (suggesting that VSS firms are more likely to lead harmonization efforts
than intergovernmental treaties). The threshold requirements and rigor of VSS appear to
vary with the requirements and rigor of government regulation, suggesting that nations may
well be served to incentivize producers to comply with private VSS, rather than maintain
their own separate schemes. See id. at 37 (citing a study of forestry certification in forty-
seven countries); OECD REPORT, supra note 76, at 15. Should a government choose to incen-
tivize participation in a single standard or group of standards, the government should
appreciate the impact of its endorsement and should thoughtfully consider which VSS it
chooses to work with. See generally NORMA TREGURTHA & DAVID D’HOLLANDER, MEETING
SUSTAINABILITY GOALS: VOLUNTARY SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS AND THE ROLE OF GOVERN-
MENT 49 (2016) https://unfss.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/final_unfss-report_28092016
.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVM9-TTSD]. The author recommends that stakeholders partici-
pate in a global conversation to determine co-regulation best practices. Id. at 49.
272 ITC, supra note 270, at 39–40.
2018] ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 129
working from a meta-regulation perspective, should a global South nation
consider a national standard, the nation should seek to harmonize the
standard with existing domestic standards.273 If the product is generally
exported, such as coffee, again to the extent possible, the standards should
be harmonized with international standards. International standard-
setting bodies such as the ISO and ISEAL Alliance provide regulatory
space for developing countries to develop standards that migrate toward
internationally recognized standards.274
3. Global South VSS Should Include Collective Assessment
Provisions
As noted above, the development of effective VSS has been hin-
dered by the dearth of research evaluating VSS impacts on stakeholders
and the environment. Concerns about VSS governance also arise from a
consumer-facing perspective. Seventy-eight percent of VSS have power
to impose sanctions on certified entities, but 26 percent of that group do
not conduct compliance evaluations and 66 percent do not publically dis-
close their evaluations.275 This data is troubling on a number of levels.
First, 22 percent of the VSS have no power to sanction certified entities
that fail to abide by standards. Absent such power, a VSS’s ability to facili-
tate environmental change is considerably weakened because the certi-
fied entity has no incentive to change practices. The same is true for those
VSS that have the power to sanction, but fail to use it. The VSS that
conduct compliance evaluations but fail to publicly disclose their findings
preclude the public from learning whether certified entities are engaged
in environmentally responsible conduct and provide the opportunity to
cover irresponsible conduct.276 The lack of public accountability erodes
the important signaling function that VSS provide to consumers.
273 For example, when Kenya sought to establish a national food safety standard, it choose
to develop a standard consistent with a GLOBALG.A.P., a prominent international agricul-
tural standard setter. ITC, supra note 270, at 35–36.
274 See Members Eligibility for Capacity Building Support by ISO, ISO (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/-9871253/9871275/9871278/17795594/ISO_re
gions_of_liaison_2017-02-01%28E%29.pdf?nodeid=18705219&vernum=-2 [https://perma
.cc/XZ93-3QEK] (detailing ISO’s work with developing countries); ISEAL, SETTING SOCIAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 19 (2014), https://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default
/files/resource/2017-11/ISEAL_Standard_Setting_Code_v6_Dec_2014.pdf [https://perma
.cc/WH4G-6ENU] (requiring that members’ standards conform to international standards
unless doing so would be ineffective or inappropriate).
275 COLLINS ET AL., supra note 188, at 14.
276 See id.
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Only 40 percent of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (“MSIs”) provide
a complaint mechanism to receive and address concerns about certified
entities’ conduct.277 Such mechanisms are important because they offer
communities the ability to notify MSIs when a certified entity is not acting
in conformity with the standards.278 The failure of 60 percent of the MSIs
to provide complaint mechanisms, and the fact that the vast majority do
not include affected populations in their primary decision-making bodies,
support the inference that MSIs are generally less concerned with their
work among affected populations and more concerned with managing their
industry or civil society stakeholder expectations.279 MSIs’ lack of engage-
ment with affected populations may explain why there is little uptake of
standards among affected populations and why even when there is up-
take, there is no clear pattern of positive environmental impact as a result
of certification.
Any future global South-based VSS must include requirements for
the assessment and evaluation of the impacts of the VSS. To the extent
that VSS are subject to meta-regulation and harmonized as described
above, public and private regulators should require individual VSS to as-
sess their impacts and effectiveness, and the VSS should be required to
share their assessment results with a central standardizing body so that
aggregate VSS performance can be studied and the findings translated
into improved performance for all VSS. Absent such a requirement, a few
VSS may choose to engage in such assessment, but market pressures will
likely keep the VSS from engaging in the kind of information sharing
proposed here, which is essential to improving the performance of the VSS.
C. Intergovernmental Agreements Do Not Pose a Threat to the
Development of Global South-Based VSS
Should the global South VSS operate in international markets, the
steps recommended here are not likely to be a problem for international
trade regulation. Through the WTO’s TBT280 and TRIPS,281 the WTO gov-
erns members’ trade with one another. The WTO is not a problem here
for two reasons: first, the relevant WTO Agreements provide regulatory
space for the development of environmental VSS in the global South, and
277 Id. at 17.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 18.
280 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201, https://www.wto
.org/english/res-e/publications_e/tbttotrade_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/E97G-54PM].
281 Id. at 7, 9.
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second, even if a global South VSS conflicts with WTO provisions, enforce-
ment against the global South VSS is highly unlikely, given the expense
and length of time associated with WTO enforcement actions.
In an effort to keep environmental VSS from becoming a pretext
for restrictions on international trade, the TBT’s Code of Good Practice
prescribes standards that (1) treat a nation’s products more favorably
than like products from another country,282 or (2) create “unnecessary
obstacles to international trade.”283 As to harmonization, the TBT com-
pels VSS to use international standards as a basis for the VSS, unless
doing so would be “ineffective or inappropriate.”284 The TBT’s provisions
expressly apply to member states that enact VSS,285 and arguably apply
to non-state actors engaged in the same conduct.286
TBT Article 12 provides a safe harbor for VSS operating in develop-
ing countries because it calls upon developed countries to provide differ-
ential and more favorable treatment to VSS in developing countries,
requiring developed countries to “take into account the special develop-
ment, financial, and trade needs of developing country [m]embers.”287
Article 12 also permits the WTO TBT Committee to grant developing coun-
tries specific, time limited exceptions from TBT obligations.288 In addition,
the Preamble to the TBT, which draws upon the chapeau test of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article XX, contemplates that a VSS
may depart from the TBT if done for the purpose of protecting the envi-
ronment and departing from the TBT does not result in “arbitrary or
unjustif[ied] discrimination.”289
282 Id. at 61 ¶ D.
283 Id. at 61 ¶ E. For a comprehensive treatment of the TBT’s impact on developing country
VSS, see Jeffrey J. Minneti, Rising Together: Clarifying the International Environmental
Marketing Claim Regulatory Landscape so that Developing Country Exporters May More
Effectively Market their Environmentally Responsible Products, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 1, 12–23 (2011).
284 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 at 61 ¶ F.
285 Id. at 44 art. 4.1.
286 Id. (requiring that member states take reasonable measures to ensure that non-state
actors operating within them comply with the TBT’s Code of Good Practice).
287 Id. at 54 arts. 12.1–12.2.
288 Id. at 55 art. 12.8.
289 Id. at 39. Critics of the WTO agreements assert that the rules favor free trade because
the trade-related provisions are broad in scope, the environmental exceptions are nar-
rowly defined, and the WTO dispute settlement panels are not sufficiently neutral and
lack the expertise necessary to strike the appropriate balance between trade and environ-
mental goals. See Daniel C. Etsy & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness and
Harmonization, Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 265, 328–30 (1997). A review of WTO jurisprudence suggests that the preamble’s
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TRIPS provides a baseline level of intellectual property rights.290
As with the TBT, TRIPS mandates that a member nation’s product mark
requirements treat other nations’ similar products no less favorably.291
Like the TBT, TRIPS provides safe harbors for least-developed countries.292
Such countries need only comply with TRIPS “to the extent consistent
with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or their
administrative and institutional capabilities,” and TRIPS rules will be
applied in a “flexible and supportive manner.”293
In spite of the safe harbors mentioned above, should a global South
VSS run afoul of the TBT or TRIPS, the VSS need not fear sanction under
either agreement.294 Enforcement under each carries a heavy price tag, in
part because the enforcement provisions are broad legal standards, rather
than precise legal tests.295 Consequently, even identifying a breach of the
agreements becomes a challenge. While the agreements provide a wealth
of sanctions in the event of finding noncompliance, reaching them requires
significant costs, including the expertise needed to state a claim, the collec-
tion and processing of data in support of the claim, and the time to work
through the enforcement procedures.296 These costs are borne by govern-
ments, which, especially in the global South, have few resources to spare.297
Further, for VSS operating locally on goods consumed locally, such as a
VSS affixed to Patagonian cod, there is little risk that the VSS would run
afoul of any international trade agreement, because the cod is not an in-
ternational commodity.
“arbitrary and unjustified” standard is extremely difficult to satisfy. See Stephanie
Hartmann, Comparing the National Treatment Obligation of the GATT and the TBT: Lessons
Learned from the EC-Seal Products Dispute, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629, 660 (2015).
290 Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking Inter-
national Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 19–20 (2011).
291 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Oct. 30, 1947) Article IX ¶ 1.
292 Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries, WTO, https://www.wto
.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31-dlldc_e.htm#31 [https://perma.cc/2S33-WFVA] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2018).
293 Id.
294 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 485 (2011)
(identifying five challenges to TRIPS’ enforcement: historical, economic, tactical, disci-
plinary, and technological).
295 See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 at 61 (prescrib-
ing standards on “like products” that provide “less favourable treatment” to products from
other countries and the TBT’s Article 12 safe harbor provisions); Yu, supra note 294, at 482.
296 See Yu, supra note 294, at 487–91; Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements,
Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 435, 447–51 (2002)
(describing the WTO dispute resolution process).
297 See Yu, supra note 294, at 487–88.
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D. Meta-regulation, Harmonization, and Collective Assessment Are
Feasible Steps
There are actors in place to enable the global South to take the steps
proposed here. The United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards
(“UNFSS”) and private entities such ISEAL Alliance, GLOBALG.A.P.,
and the Committee on Sustainable Assessment (“COSA”) have the re-
sources and experience necessary to partner with nations in the global
South and facilitate their development of VSS that are consistent with
Relational Integrity Regulation principles, domestically and internation-
ally harmonized, and continually assessed.
A primary objective of the UNFSS is to empower the global South
to realize the potential economic and environmental benefits of VSS by
providing an information platform for decision-makers.298 UNFSS has
positioned itself to pay particular attention to global South smallholder
and medium-sized producers.299
ISEAL Alliance is a global membership association for VSS.300 Its
mission is to provide VSS expertise to public and private VSS stakeholders,
measure and share the impact of VSS, solve problems that arise with VSS
implementation, and build support for VSS.301 It has produced Codes of
Good Practice (“The Codes”) for standard setting, standard auditing, and
assessing the social and environmental impacts of the standards.302 The
Codes are consistent with Relational Integrity Regulation because the
provisions are reflexive, preference- and process-directed, and provide VSS
the regulatory space necessary to activate consumers’ personal norms.
The provisions are inherently reflexive because they do not prescribe
specific provisions for any one certification scheme, but they set standards
for the development of credible standards. The provisions associated with
298 UNFSS Objectives, UNFSS, https://unfss.org/about-us/objectives/ [https://perma.cc
/UDV8-9DEC] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018); UNFSS Focus, UNFSS, https://unfss.org/about
-us/focus/ [https://perma.cc/R8YE-25V2] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
299 UNFSS Focus, supra note 298.
300 About ISEAL, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/about-iseal [https://
perma.cc/HU2W-5W9A] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
301 Our Mission, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/about-iseal/our-mission
[https://perma.cc/H7UZ-HS83] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). Commentators note that
ISEAL has become a VSS “watchdog,” defining credible VSS and signaling to the market
those that have satisfied its standards. Marx & Wouters, supra note 94, at 22–23.
302 ISEAL Codes of Good Practice, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/credi
ble-sustainability-standards/iseal-codes-good-practice [https://perma.cc/JU2M-P6YQ] (last
visited Nov. 17, 2018) [hereinafter The Codes].
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standard setting require an assessment of the need for the standard, the
scope of the standard, its stakeholders, the process for developing the
standard, that the public have an opportunity to review and comment on
the standard, that all stakeholders have a genuine opportunity to partici-
pate in decision-making,303 and that the standard is regularly reviewed.304
The provisions require VSS to address products’ processes and produc-
tion.305 The Assurance Code provides standards for certifying products,
and includes the management of the certification process.306 The Impacts
Code sets standards for monitoring and evaluating the extent to which
the standard is accomplishing its social or environmental purposes and
for continuously improving the VSS performance.307
The Codes require that to the extent possible, VSS harmonize
with other domestic and international standards.308 Provision 4.2 of the
Standard Setting Code requires that, prior to establishing a new VSS,
the VSS initiator must inform other organizations with similar standards
of the initiator’s interest in creating a new standard and seek the input of
the organizations with similar standards.309 The Provision’s desired out-
come is to avoid duplication and have consistency between standards
with overlapping scopes.310 Standard Setting Provision 6.3 requires that
national or regional VSS use international standards as a basis for devel-
oping new standards, unless the international standards would be inef-
fective or inappropriate, and that standards are as consistent as possible
with international standards and at least as rigorous.311
303 Access to VSS, supra note 125, at 20. VSS that are full members of ISEAL are far more
likely to engage in more producer-friendly practices. Id.
304 The Codes, supra note 302. The Code of Good Practice is rooted in a set of “Credibility
Principles,” which ISEAL identified in consultation with 400 stakeholders worldwide.
The Credibility Principles include sustainability, improvement, relevance, rigor, engage-
ment, impartiality, transparency, accessibility, truthfulness, and efficiency. Id.
305 Id. at 19 (stating that standards shall “be expressed in terms of process, management
and performance criteria, rather than design or descriptive characteristics”).
306 ISEAL, ASSURING COMPLIANCE WITH SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: ISEAL
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE (2017), https://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/resource
/2017-11/ISEAL_Assurance_Code_Version_1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJL2-YM5F].
307 ISEAL, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS SYSTEMS:
ISEAL CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE (2014), https://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/re
source/2017-11-ISEAL_Impacts_Code_v2_Dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PVP-G2JR].
308 The Codes, supra note 302.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
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In contrast to ISEAL, which focuses on setting requirements for
standard setting, GLOBALG.A.P. prescribes actual standards and certifies
crops, livestock, and aquaculture.312 The scheme is vertically differenti-
ated through localg.a.p., which is an assurance program designed for pro-
ducers who seek to supply goods to a market that requires certification
but are unable to satisfy the requirements associated with GLOBALG.A.P.
certification.313 Localg.a.p. provides a step-up certification system, allow-
ing producers up to five years of localg.a.p. assurance monitoring before
the producers must seek full GLOBALG.A.P. certification.314 During the
localg.a.p. assurance time frame, producers can move from being Founda-
tion members to Intermediate members, reflecting their progression to
more rigorous standards.315
Like GLOBALG.A.P., COSA is involved with setting agricultural
standards, but in contrast to GLOBALG.A.P., COSA works with organi-
zations, from producers to VSS such as UTZ, to help them identify their
sustainability goals and create standards and measurement tools to assess
whether the goals are being met.316 COSA’s measurement tools are scien-
tifically sound, statistically valid, and consider the social, environmental,
and economic dimensions of the standards.317 Having created effective
sustainability measurement tools, COSA seeks to manage the data col-
lected from the tools so that the public can access the data to make more
informed sustainability choices.318
CONCLUSION
After more than twenty years of growth, VSS have not yet reached
their potential in the global South. Some commodities have seen a robust
312 Certification For Producers, GLOBALG.A.P., http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we
-do/globalg.a.p.-certification [https://perma.cc/Y3JK-YEVW] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
313 The Stepping Stone to Safe and Sustainable Agriculture, GLOBALG.A.P., http://www
.globalgap.org/uk_en_what-we-do/globalg.a.p.-certification/localg.a.p [https://perma.cc
/ZHS4-JFJG] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
314 Frequently Asked Questions: About localg.a.p., GLOBALG.A.P., https://www.globalgap
.org/uk_en/what-we-do/globalg.a.p.-certification/localg.a.p./faq/index.html [https://perma
.cc/4D2N-7GX3] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
315 Id.
316 Our Impact, COSA, https://thecosa.org/what-we-do/our-impact/ [https://perma.cc/7A8B
-CC5E] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018); Our Approach, COSA, https://thecosa.org/what-we-do
/our-approach [https://perma.cc/TR5F-GLX3] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
317 Our Approach, COSA, https://thecosa.org/what-we-do/our-approach/ [https://perma.cc
/RR5U-66KS] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
318 Id.
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increase in certification, such as coffee and forestry products, but others,
such as fisheries, are largely untouched. In general, certified communities
have not provided producers, consumers, or the environment with the
benefits that VSS have to offer. While market forces will likely continue
to drive North-based schemes into the South, the global South can and
should do better. By incorporating VSS with relational integrity into their
environmental governance schemes, harmonizing the VSS, and engaging
in continuous assessment of the VSS, the global South will realize the
benefits that VSS offer.
Coffee producers in Kodagu, India, are in an interesting position.
A number of global North-based VSS are eager to certify their products,
and India has recently launched its own nationwide VSS platform. Should
that platform incorporate relational integrity principles, the platform is
more likely to be effective. The very existence of the platform suggests the
potential for thoughtful harmonization of public and private VSS. Drawing
upon the support of organizations such as ISEAL and COSA, India can en-
sure that the VSS that operate within it deliver on the goods VSS offer.
Argentine fisheries are in a different position. Few VSS operate
in the market, perhaps because, unlike Indian coffee, which is largely ex-
ported, much of the Patagonian cod the fisheries catch are consumed
domestically, and as a result, there is less demand from the global North
for certified fish than certified coffee. Given the depletion in fish stock
and the potential for more environmentally responsible fishing practices
to protect and grow the stock, conditions are ripe in Argentina for the
creation of a public-private VSS scheme incorporated into a broader web
of environmental governance. Again, international organizations stand
ready to partner with Argentina as it takes these next steps.
As an environmental governance tool, VSS have flourished; perhaps
during the next twenty years, they will sufficiently mature to deliver on
the promise they hold for the global South.
